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What can we learn, from international best practice 
and from within the UK, that could help support the 
expanded financing of affordable housing supply?
this report reviews international evidence from selected case studies, as well 
as examples from specific UK nations. it also looks in detail at a small set of 
specific promising case study policies.
•	 in a challenging fiscal context, innovation is needed to stretch limited 
public subsidy and increase private contributions to help deliver additional 
affordable housing.
•	 the evidence review indicates that in order to encourage new investment, 
supply is likely to be at the affordable rather than the social housing end 
of the spectrum. this is despite the pressures on Housing Benefit and 
high and increased levels of housing need.
•	 While interesting ideas that are worth exploration and possible transfer 
are evident, financial measures such as those discussed here need to be 
understood in a wider policy context of housing system failure and the 
continuing need to support new housing for those on low incomes.
contents
 executive summary 03
 introduction 07
1 Background and context for the study 09
2 overview of existing knowledge 14
3 reflecting on our approach 20
4 north america and australia 22
5 europe 33
6 the United Kingdom 44
7 synthesis and conclusions 55
 notes 61
 references 63
 acknowledgements 66
 about the authors 67
list of figures
1 Housing starts (2005–11) 35
2 approvals for construction 2000–10 37
3 ras outputs (end 2005–end 2010) 39
list of tables
1 Financial conditions for third sector housing development  
in denmark 37
03
executIve suMMary
financing affordable housing supply
public funding cuts and scarce mortgage credit have made it much more 
difficult to finance the supply of new affordable housing. this study highlights 
promising policies from the UK and abroad that provide innovative funding 
ideas to increase the supply of below-market-price housing.
Key points
•	 the general shift upmarket to supply shallower subsidy and affordable 
rather than social housing means higher rents and more limited security 
of tenure. this will have profound consequences for people on low 
incomes.
•	 this movement, amplified by innovations found elsewhere, suggests a 
number of emerging themes. on the one hand, there is a desire to use 
more state-backed guarantees, encourage competition among providers, 
sweat existing assets and encourage alternative sources of provider 
income. on the other hand, opportunities also exist to ‘blend’ different 
subsidies creatively and encourage solidarity-based co-operation among 
providers.
•	 in the longer term, fundamental market failures such as in the land and 
credit markets will need addressing, and funding programmes for social 
housing prioritised if rising housing need is to be met. this will need to 
be part of a clear, overarching policy vision identifying the overall mix of 
policies, which would also need to include how they are to be delivered 
and by whom.
background
alongside a companion study on land supply (by the University of 
cambridge), this review draws on national and international evidence on 
innovative ways to support financing for new affordable housing supply. it is 
set in a context of declining public funds for housing and mortgage market 
failure. recent housing policy has focused on low-income households, 
because home ownership and liberal mortgage lending catered for the great 
majority. this is now threatened. the government seeks to encourage private 
sector participation in higher rent intermediate or affordable rented supply, 
rather than traditional social housing. this gives rise to tensions, because 
financial logic shifts the focus to the mid-market, whereas housing need 
suggests a requirement for more social housing.
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emerging themes
despite an appetite for state-backed guarantees, caution is required. 
Guarantees have been debated in europe as sources of unfair competition. 
currently, given prevailing interest rates, investors may receive guarantees 
less warmly simply as a mechanism to reduce borrowing risk and hence 
the cost of borrowing. Moreover, recent financial governance problems 
associated with dutch social housing are a warning to the UK. there have 
been concerns about market distortions associated with state-backed 
guarantees. However, the scottish national Housing trust offers a low-cost 
intermediate solution with potentially flexible exit routes, and including 
more long-term and social provision options. competition or contestability 
among providers (both for profit and non-profit) is important, encouraging 
efficiency, lower subsidy costs and experimentation.
the evidence suggests that subsidy can be distributed from the 
centre (national tax authorities or federal programmes) to lower tiers of 
government, which have more local freedom to augment subsidy (with land, 
for instance) for locally tailored, affordable solutions. such arrangements are 
possible in the UK. subsidies from different tiers of government and agencies 
in federal/devolved systems could be combined, as a more discretionary 
and flexible use of subsidy. again, this can promote experimental, tailored 
solutions.
innovation in housing policy is increasingly ‘bottom-up’, with national 
policy responses framed around relatively simple supports that can be locally 
blended and augmented to serve different purposes. However, the need for 
value for money means that tests are required to ensure that subsidy is not 
over-provided or poorly targeted. regulators could oversee subsidy systems, 
through tests by relevant agencies checking for value for money, or by 
incentivising bidding mechanisms.
various european systems indicate that social housing can benefit 
financially (and in its governance) from more solidarity-based or collaborative 
structures. While this may not be culturally translatable to national non-
market housing systems in the UK, it may be feasible on a smaller, more local 
or specialist scale, such as community-based housing association clubs within 
a city-region. collaborative models such as pooling and recycling surpluses 
and linked revolving funds – i.e. recycling original funding – could operate 
alongside subsidy mechanisms encouraging lower cost and less-per-unit 
subsidy through competition.
policy-makers and providers are increasingly interested in management 
income streams associated with real estate investment trusts, sale and 
leaseback vehicles and tax credit models. additional revenue is also 
increasingly important to social providers, but is not a guaranteed source of 
income. in contrast to complex schemes, simple schemes which users can 
understand are valuable, as the effects are easy to follow and unintended 
consequences less likely. canadian ‘silent mortgages’ (like second mortgages 
but where the repayment terms are flexible and may in fact be discounted in 
different ways) and policies like revolving funds possess these features.
the shift upmarket in rent levels has meant relatively shallow subsidy per 
unit, so that more units can be funded from a given sum of public money. 
if the overall funding programme still operated at pre-austerity levels, this 
resource could be stretched in terms of units completed. But mechanisms 
like the affordable Homes programme operate at much reduced scale (they 
also risk not delivering the planned scale of output). the other key measure 
is ‘sweating’ providers’ existing assets. the affordable Homes programme 
is such a process, capturing the rise in balance sheets and financial capacity 
associated with the property boom. this is a more volatile, risky approach. 
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it depends on asset growth and maximum gearing of loans, raising new 
financial governance and regulatory requirements.
the scope for innovation is closely related to the regulatory context – not 
just social housing governance, but also the interface between non-profit 
housing and the private financial sector and its regulation. public accounting 
rules also determine the degree of flexibility and providers’ financial capacity 
to borrow when subsidy, public loans or guarantees are involved.
transferable international policy examples
Many policies have merit for the UK context, but measured against the tests 
outlined above, six have particular potential:
1 The Spanish VPO (‘officially protected housing’) developer/occupier new 
supply subsidy. this has provided scale, responsiveness and efficient 
subsidy but, while means-tested, has been less tightly targeted and has 
somewhat succumbed to the economic crisis. it is flexible in principle, if 
not completely transparent. the scheme is readily transferable as it would 
not require new institutional infrastructure, and could stimulate activity.
2 The Australian National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS) tax credit 
application of the US low-income housing tax credit model. the combination 
of competition among providers, opportunities to blend subsidy and 
beneficial placemaking (designing and managing public spaces through 
ongoing consultation with the local community) are attractive innovations. 
nras targets moderate income households, with capped subsidy, and can 
operate responsively and to scale.
3 State-backed loan guarantees on the lines of the Scottish National Housing 
Trust, rather than as a way of generally lowering the cost of bonds (as 
the new english £10 million fund will do), or a Dutch-style guarantee and 
governance model. the scottish model offers tailored outcomes and is 
only a marginal public finance commitment.
4 Policies to assist sustainable home ownership. these include first time buyer 
policies that assist with deposits, via the canadian silent mortgage or 
adjustment to FirstBuy or newBuy models, such that the indemnity allows 
for a slightly higher (or more conservative) deposit percentage than the 
5 per cent currently in practice.
5 The Danish housing association national surplus fund. While based on 
solidarity principles that may seem alien to the UK, this allows creative use 
of surplus funds, though the government may simply offset the fund with 
lower subsidy. However, this may be a more acceptable way voluntarily to 
unlock housing association long-term ‘free’ reserves.
6 The Irish model of private renting with a discounted long-lease rent. this 
addresses work incentives and augments affordable supply by binding 
private landlords into long leases and sub-market rents. this model 
has grown quickly in ireland and may act to limit future social security 
expenditure.
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conclusion
a strategic housing policy needs suitable framing within a long-term policy 
vision rather than tackling crises as they arise. long-term housing policy 
needs to address market failures such as in the credit market and seek to 
permanently reduce housing market volatility. that means re-examining 
housing taxation and the safety net for vulnerable home owners. it would 
also mean supporting the private rented sector’s wider market role (for 
example through developing investment linked to self-invested pension 
plans). long-term flexibility in housing supply needs to be increased 
systematically, which will involve changes to the land supply and planning 
system.
caution is required to avoid hasty transfer of policies from abroad. While 
this review has identified interesting ideas with potential value for the UK, it 
would be important to test their performance and assess their institutional 
suitability for transfer (e.g. the role of welfare benefit regimes in shaping and 
sustaining housing supply).
the financial crisis and its ramifications have initiated a fundamental 
reassessment of how to provide non-market housing, who will receive it and 
on what terms. affordable housing policy, while financially much reduced, is 
remarkably fluid and subject to innovations and novelty. it remains essential 
that such innovation be securely located in a long-term policy framework 
that is coherent, progressive, inclusive for those in pressing housing need, 
and consistent with tackling market failures.
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IntroductIon
this report is a contribution to the debate 
concerning the search for innovative ways to 
support the financing of affordable housing 
supply. it looks at detailed international evidence 
from selected case studies as well as potentially 
transferable examples from within the UK.
the report starts with an introduction that sets out the aims of the project 
and how the team addressed the research brief. the first substantive section 
describes and reflects on the challenging context for new affordable housing 
supply and on the pivotal role that finance plays. this is followed by (chapter 
2) a selective overview of the contemporary research and policy literature. 
chapter 3 reflects on the issues raised thus far, before setting out the 
approach taken to identify and examine a small set of promising UK and 
international financial models that may encourage new affordable housing 
supply. the next three chapters consider our findings region by region 
before reaching the synthesis and conclusions in chapter 7.
project objectives
the aim of the research is to critically review the international and UK 
evidence (that is, across the four devolved nations, as well as the special case 
of london) concerning innovative ways of financing low cost housing across 
all tenures. the study asks which models have the potential to produce 
the most housing in the short, medium and long term. a supplementary 
question asks what reforms would be necessary to adapt the most promising 
international/UK approaches (and which models require further analysis or 
testing)?
research design
the project team conducted a search of academic and grey literature at 
the UK and international scale. drawing our own policy networks (for 
example, in the UK, europe, north america and australasia), team members 
developed a long list and then a focused short list of promising candidate 
policies or programmes. this ‘search’ was augmented by in-country local 
experts in different parts of europe who completed pro formas on low cost 
housing funding models in specific countries and conducted a targeted 
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grey evidence search on our behalf. expert colleagues in both australia and 
canada provided additional support. the analysis was completed to a pre-
determined set of criteria or ‘tests’ (set out below in chapter 3), which we 
use in our analysis in the evidence chapters (chapters 4–6). We also held a 
valuable meeting on 22 June 2012 in edinburgh. We were able to piggy-
back on to a separate international project (New Times, New Businesses) run 
by the University of st andrews and this provided the opportunity to debate 
emerging ideas with the project team, academics and affordable housing 
practitioners from across the world.1
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1 background and 
context for the 
study
the affordable housing context is immensely 
challenging. the search for new financing models 
to deliver additional low cost renting and owning 
is therefore an urgent one (dclG, 2011; scottish 
Government, 2011). in the social housing sector 
investment has slumped while low levels of new 
provision are reflected in high and rising waiting 
lists. in the market sector the sluggish economy 
has suppressed demand, but it is also apparent that 
credit rationing, for builders as well as consumers, 
has meant that home ownership is now inaccessible 
to those who could actually sustain a mortgage 
but cannot secure a mortgage offer. as a result, 
there are record low levels of first time buyers with 
pressures in the private rental sector now both 
in terms of higher rents and rising overcrowding. 
Market outcomes lead to unmet needs and a sense 
of wider system failure having an impact specifically 
on lower income households.
the challenging context
annual levels of housing need in scotland were estimated (2006) to be 
around 10,000 units. in england, evidence (Bramley et al., 2010) indicated 
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large numbers of backlog need households (of the order of 8.8 per cent 
of all households) though this would slowly reduce over time (but does not 
include newly arising need). research quoted in the House of commons 
communities and local Government select committee report (april 2012) 
(HcclG, 2012) highlights the structural inability of house building to eat into 
these levels of need even before the present crisis arose (see, also, ccHpr, 
2012). the imbalance between demand and supply in england is such that 
The housing report: edition 2 (ciH et al., 2011) contrasts new build supply of 
just over 107,000 in 2010 (and averaging 150,000 over the last decade) 
with annual household growth of the order of 230,000 (quoted in ccHpr, 
2012, p. 3). large and in some cases growing waiting lists are to be found in 
all UK countries. in northern ireland, for instance, since 2001, waiting lists 
have grown from 22,000 to nearly 40,000 and in these ten years housing 
stress has risen from 10,639 to 20,967 households (niHe, 2012).
insufficient supply would be serious enough in ‘normal’ times, but is 
further compromised by the economic crisis, fiscal austerity and welfare 
reform. Job loss, business closure, part-time working and in-work poverty 
are the sharp end of economic failure. in the housing market, transactions 
have fallen sharply and stayed lower, largely because of mortgage credit 
availability problems, but at the same time prices have not corrected 
downwards to the extent that they did in the early 1990s. despite, 
historically low interest rates, market trends and the lack of credit have 
combined to prevent normal market functioning.
as a result, the market is less able to provide cross subsidy. this fatally 
damages many of the strategies that were extensively used in the last decade 
that relied on additional resources either from the provider, purchaser 
equity or from landowners, such as section 106 planning agreements. 
a further consequence is the way the ‘new normal’ alters what we mean 
by ‘affordability’. Many providers are obliged to expand their activities by 
shifting provision upmarket, thereby redefining and stretching the idea of 
affordability and shifting the target group towards intermediate rent.
the evidence review will therefore need be to be clear about different 
ideas of affordability as well as different financial models so that one can 
identify models that may help those with least resources. the very concept of 
affordability is an inherently slippery and perhaps unhelpful one. in addition 
to funding benchmarks used by government agencies (for example, the level 
of rent allowed that can repay debt), affordability has three dimensions that 
do not necessarily operate in the same way in different national contexts:
•	 How are ‘affordable’ housing costs set relative to market equivalent 
benchmarks? are they at social rent levels as understood in the UK or 
placed somewhere intermediate to the market level, or are they ‘capped’ 
as a proportion of recipient income in some way (for example, in relation 
to welfare benefits)? in order to make private investor returns viable, 
rents are increasingly expected to be in the intermediate zone between 
social and market rents (known as mid-market or intermediate or just 
sometimes affordable rents).
•	 tenancy security also varies between the market level and social renting 
and ‘affordable housing’ is increasingly towards the market end of the 
spectrum, but there clearly could be a trade-off between tenure (that is, 
occupancy length) security and relative rent level.
•	 access to housing and relative need also varies according to the spectrum 
between market, affordable and social housing. again, allocation to 
affordable housing is not necessarily targeted as strictly as social rented 
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housing (for example, the focus may be on key workers and an income 
ceiling may apply).
therefore, being clear about what we mean by low cost is important both 
analytically and politically.
this is the context in which the UK and devolved governments are 
exploring alternative financing. all governments are facing departmental 
spending cuts. not surprisingly, these fall heavily on capital funding-intensive 
housing programmes. pawson and Wilcox (2011, pp. 74–81) summarise the 
impact of the housing cuts arising from the 2010 spending review:
•	 there was a reduction in england in the total dwellings approved from 
58,000 to 20,000 comparing the 2008–9 to 2010–11 programme 
with the 2011–12 to 2014–15 programme. this is achieved in part 
by a fall in grant from £8.9 billion to just £1.8 billion comparing the two 
programmes.
•	 scottish public investment in affordable housing fell less, though still, in 
real terms, between 2011–12 and 2014–15 by 36 per cent (45 per cent 
cash).
•	 Welsh spending on housing association capital development peaked at 
£135 million in 2008–9, but thereafter declined, falling to £48.1 million 
in 2013–14.
•	 in northern ireland, investment in new housing association (voluntary 
sector) housing grew to £183 million in 2010–11, but will fall to 
£122 million in 2012–13.
Moreover, governments will have to deal with the consequences of higher 
levels of need brought on by the recession, demographic change, the lack of 
access to market alternatives, and now also deep cuts to, and restructuring 
of, key personal subsidies, in particular, housing benefit. the changes to 
housing benefit will have marked impacts in high cost regions such as 
Greater london, but will also significantly affect single people in private 
renting, under-occupiers, non-dependents and those in large households.
strategic responses?
dclG announced Laying the foundations: a housing strategy for England 
towards the end of 2011, supplemented by a Housing Stimulus package 
announced in september 2012. Four major measures proposed were: 
reinvigorating the right to buy (rtB) scheme with an attempt to guarantee 
replacement social units, the re-use of public land to build up to 100,000 
units (Build now, pay later), reform of planning as part of the localism 
legislation and, the NewBuy mortgage guarantee or indemnity for new build 
(alongside a FirstBuy scheme co-funded by the public sector and house 
builders to provide 20 per cent equity loans for first time purchasers seeking 
to buy new homes). other related initiatives from this period include the New 
homes bonus (aimed at encouraging councils to grant planning permission 
for new homes by offering additional revenue through matching council tax 
for six years, and the Growing places fund that supports infrastructure which 
facilitates housing and economic growth, and the Get Britain building fund (a 
new fund to support development finance).
at the same time other longer term streams of work have included the 
consultation over social reits (see chapter 6) and the Montague review 
(2012) of the barriers to institutional investment in the private rented 
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sector, which called for reform of planning, including flexibility regarding 
section 106 agreements to favour private renting and for more land 
release if a proportion of market renting was included in developments. 
the Montague review was supported in the government’s Stimulus package 
(House of commons library, september, 2012). as part of this initiative, 
the government also proposed making £10 billion of guarantees available 
to underwrite new housing debt by housing associations (and private 
developers). in response to the negative effects of proposing freeing 
up section 106 obligations in order to stimulate private house building, 
the Government also proposed additional funds for 15,000 homes to 
compensate for those lost under the section 106 changes.
affordable homes Programme (ahP)
the aHp replaced the mixed funding programme for housing 
associations with new supply premised on shallower grants, higher 
rents, fixed-term tenancies and revenue subsidy from charging higher 
rents on vacant relets of existing property. the aHp is premised on 
the exploitation of the positive housing association balance sheet 
effects of rising property values on financial capacity prior to the global 
financial crisis (GFc) (public accounts committee, 2012). the aHp 
is expected to deliver 170,000 units, largely towards the end of the 
2011–15 period though a proportion of the programme has been 
compromised by (a) the unwillingness of some local authorities to 
allow what they consider to be unaffordable rents and (b) the impact 
of the proposed increased flexibility over revisions to the section 106 
agreements. these policies are controversial and have been subject to 
critical scrutiny (see, for instance, the clG select committee report, 
2012 (HcclG, 2012); the public accounts committee report on the 
affordable Homes programme, 2012; ccHpr, 2012; and The housing 
report: edition 3 (ciH et al., 2012).
in scotland, the snp Government produced Homes fit for the 21st century 
(sG, 2011). this aimed to boost affordable housing supply by around a target 
of 30,000 social and affordable units over the five years of the parliament, 
two-thirds of which would be for social rent and 5,000 would be new council 
housing. Housing association general needs housing would be supported 
at historically low average grant levels of £40,000 per unit (£30,000 for 
councils). the total would also include units delivered through the national 
Housing trust mid-market rent initiative, lower subsidy housing association 
development, shared equity and a range of innovation projects and initiatives 
to support supply (such as infrastructure funding support). the first year 
of the parliament (2011–12) delivered 6,800 social and affordable units 
(though these completions were largely funded on earlier, more generous 
rules).
in 2010 the Welsh Government produced Improving Lives and 
Communities: Homes in Wales (Welsh assembly Government, 2010), which 
highlighted the importance of building more affordable housing against 
the backdrop of the 2008 essex review (essex et al., 2008) of affordable 
housing and public finance challenges. a range of proposals sought to 
meet this challenge including the development of a Welsh housing bond or 
investment trust, bringing forward more publicly owned land and reforming 
the housing revenue account (Hra) subsidy system.
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the northern ireland context is informed by the deepest reversal in any 
housing market in the UK. into this context, the northern ireland Housing 
executive is to be restructured, potentially releasing funds for investment 
in affordable housing. the northern ireland government is pledged to 
deliver 8,000 social and affordable units between 2011–15 which matches 
aggregate need estimates but is within the context of a fall of a third in 
capital spending on housing (niHe, 2012). Meeting the target is described as 
‘very challenging’.
the Revised London Housing Strategy draft published at the end of 2011 
by the Mayor of london (Gla, 2011) takes place in the context of increased 
strategic housing powers as a result of the localism legislation. london faces 
housing affordability problems on a scale unique in the UK – for example, 
700,000 additional households are anticipated over the next 20 years and 
nearly 250,000 households are overcrowded. the scale of the affordable 
supply response is also correspondingly large – more than 14,000 affordable 
units were completed in 2010–11 alone. High land prices, competition for 
space and the challenging public finance circumstances nonetheless make 
affordable provision very challenging.
later in the report we will look at several of these current and potential 
initiatives in more detail. Before moving on to that stage, however, we first 
briefly overview key published research and academic literature.
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2 overvIew 
of exIstIng 
knowledge
in the current climate, there have been a number 
of relevant studies. recent research and policy 
publications in the UK include: the essex review of 
affordable housing (essex et al., 2008), the semple 
affordability review (2007), Morton (2010), BHsF 
(2011), ciH (scotland) (2009), o’sullivan (2010), 
Hall and Gibb (2010), Whitehead (2010), oxley 
et al. (2010), Williams et al. (2011), Hull and cooke 
(2012), clarke (2011), Gibb (2011), cambridge 
centre for Housing and planning research (ccHpr) 
(2012) and House of commons communities and 
local Government select committee (2012). a 
further international comparative study on similar 
terrain is lawson et al. (2010).
the essex review of affordable housing in Wales was published in 2008 
(essex et al., 2008) and made a number of relevant recommendations. this 
included the use of land, cross-subsidy, cheaper finance and increased 
leverage, as well as more borrowing capacity. this led them to look at 
housing associations’ assets and rent regimes, the Welsh Hra system and 
its reform. in northern ireland, the semple review of affordable housing 
(2007) concluded that more planning instruments were required along the 
lines of s106 agreements in england, and that more community land trusts 
were needed, and a more proactive role by government agencies to make 
land available. it also found that more support should be offered to successful 
intermediate products such as the northern ireland co-ownership housing 
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association and that grants should be made available to bodies other than 
housing associations for the delivery of social or affordable housing.
policy exchange produced a radical set of proposals (Morton, 2010), 
identifying the rising and high costs of housing as well as critiquing British 
social housing and its underlying incentives. the proposed solutions include 
reforming social housing to make it a route into home ownership through 
changes in allocations and priorities centred around fixed-term tenancies. 
the report proposes the nationalisation of housing associations and council 
housing in order to facilitate a new rtB programme and sell off the existing 
stock as it becomes vacant. they would also facilitate a ‘path to ownership’ 
model wherein bonds would finance new build and rents would repay 
interest. tenant payments would allow them to build equity in the ownership 
of their home. alongside these measures would be a series of planning 
and fiscal policies to stimulate new supply and help low-income would-be 
mortgagors.
the institute for public policy research (ippr) (see Hull and cooke, 
2012) argue that what is needed involves new financial sources to support 
house building. local authority pension funds should be encouraged to invest 
in housing. a national investment bank should be created and provided with 
capital, and the accounting rules facing local government should be altered 
to be akin to general government (that is, allowing trading and borrowing). 
they argue that housing capital expenditure by government should be made 
a priority (suggesting an additional £750 million per annum for each year 
of the next spending review period). they also argue that the development 
sector needs to be shaken up with government acting as a clearing house on 
leftover land banks from failed businesses. they also propose rapid build out 
through public land programmes and incentives (for example, equity stakes) 
to encourage councils and the london mayor to release more public land for 
housing. another fiscal lever proposed is a land value tax on undeveloped but 
developable land worth more than £2 million per site. Most radically, they 
propose an ‘affordable housing grant’ combining housing benefit (HB) spend 
and capital spend and this would be given to local authorities: it would be up 
to them to decide how to use it to meet housing need, increase access and 
build homes.
two think tanks, therefore, so different politically, have arrived at the 
need for (all or nothing?) radical restructuring of the housing system as 
a whole. they also share important ideas – such as fixed-term tenancies, 
the need to reduce the price of housing and expand supply. in contrast, the 
Building and social Housing Foundation (BsHF, 2011) recommended that 
local authorities (supported by central government) should take greater 
strategic and operational leadership to assemble and parcel land to allow 
different providers to build. second, incentives, tax and regulation need to be 
reconfigured to encourage land to be brought forward by landowners. third, 
development finance and also mortgage finance need to be encouraged to 
be more forthcoming. a number of further specific proposals involved local 
authority guarantees, redefining local authority accounting practices along 
the lines of ‘general government’, the greater use of community land trusts 
and incentives to encourage empty homes back into productive use.
in scotland, the chartered institute of Housing has produced two 
volumes of proposals (ciH, 2009; o’sullivan, 2010) which outline practical 
ways to deliver more affordable housing that included:
•	 a local housing fund combining local bond issuance, public sector 
contributions to support infrastructure and locally-led first time buyer/
low cost mortgages. the latter could also involve council guarantees;
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•	 co-operative and mutual home ownership models;
•	 councils operating as builders and social housing lenders;
•	 redefining the public sector accounting practices to exclude local 
government and council housing from the borrowing controls exerted 
over the public sector;
•	 loan guarantees for the use of supporting new affordable housing based 
on the models applied to the sMe sector in the UK (and also the national 
Housing trust), which may additionally reduce the cost of finance;
•	 revolving funds and the Highland land bank fund;
•	 community land trusts;
•	 reits as a possible vehicle for affordable housing;
•	 mid-market rent and the rettie resonance model (a partnership between 
developer and social provider involving deferred land costs, and, in the 
case of the edinburgh based examples, a fixed rental risk contingency 
provided through city of edinburgh council’s affordable housing funding 
and agreed with the scottish government).
several of these ideas are discussed in more detail in chapter 6. More 
recently, also for ciH (scotland), clarke (2011) has explored the scope for 
joint ventures, equity and bond investment and the various subsidy and loan 
guarantee ideas normally through mid-market rent models (required to 
earn the necessary returns) including the government sponsored national 
Housing trust and the resonance model.
Monk and Whitehead (2010) and Whitehead (2010) examine the scope 
for shared equity and other intermediate products for home ownership. 
Market conditions will be critical to their success and the continuing failures 
in the credit market suggest limited opportunities. oxley et al. (2010) and 
Williams et al. (2011) consider the scope, limitations and international lessons 
regarding institutional investment in private renting. this also concerns the 
scope for reits and their possible evolution into affordable housing. part of 
the case for social reits and the Montague proposal derive from this type 
of research indicating that such opportunities will not be crystalised without 
change to the institutional arrangements (but even so, it is not certain that 
large-scale investment will follow – investor appetite remains uncertain).
the ccHpr (2012) analysis looks at models to deliver more affordable 
housing but in a context that recognises the need to operate in both 
high and low demand areas and in a way consistent with financial capacity 
(both the supply of funds and rental or mortgage cost affordability). their 
international evidence involves:2
•	 austria and its housing construction convertible bonds – a protected 
housing finance circuit with tax-incentivised bonds specifically for 
affordable housing;
•	 china’s inter-governmental financial system which encourages local 
government to use land sales to the private sector. While this may include 
incentives to support high-end housing, there are examples where 
the sale of the use rights of public land as a way of raising finance for 
affordable housing;
•	 France and the Livret A savings scheme – initially, a specialist provider of 
social housing finance (credit Foncier) transformed short-term individual 
deposits into cheap long-term loans for social housing. Livret A savings 
schemes are now provided across the French banking system and have 
been particularly popular as they offer the general public tax-free savings 
and security in the context of the financial insecurity of the GFc;
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•	 Hong Kong’s self-finance public housing (though it has historically 
enjoyed free public land and important sales revenues to help subsidise 
household housing costs);
•	 singapore’s compulsory employees’ social security housing savings fund, 
in place since 1955;
•	 switzerland’s guaranteed co-operative housing bond. apart from the 
ability to buy discounted land, the swiss social sector relies on revolving 
funds, bond arrangements and a federal mortgage guarantee to co-
operatives.
ccHpr review an exhaustive list of contemporary and recent UK initiatives. 
the main models reviewed are:
•	 new homes bonus;
•	 revolving land bank funds;
•	 loan guarantees, including by the scottish government;
•	 section 106 agreements and the community infrastructure levy;
•	 real estate investment trusts (reits);
•	 private finance initiative (pFi) and tax-increment financing;
•	 special purpose vehicles partnering with private developers;
•	 local asset-backed vehicles or local housing companies;
•	 new supply shared equity;
•	 bond finance including the Housing Finance corporation (tHFc), housing 
association and local authority bonds;
•	 institutional investment such as pension funds;
•	 sale and leaseback;
•	 charity and ethical banks;
•	 community land trusts.
ccHpr conclude that all of the models have strengths and weaknesses 
(weaknesses include over reliance on public subsidy, dependence on market 
cross-subsidy, or that they are just too new and different for the sector) 
but, in particular, any serious cross-national application of innovative models 
needs to be placed into a suitable context. they conclude that local fiscal 
incentives and local institutional structures for mobilising savings or capital 
set against the local regulatory context for affordable and social housing are 
important general success factors (p. 32).
the clG select committee (HcclG, 2012) included evidence on specific 
models such as social reits, institutional investment to the private rental 
sector, indemnities to support first time buyer new build purchases, creative 
proposals for the treatment of historic grant on housing association balance 
sheets, as well as other models relevant to this study – we examine these in 
chapter 6.
Finally, lawson, Gilmour and Milligan (2010) investigate six examples of 
‘developed’ and ‘well-established’ national housing systems and assess the 
quality of a given aspect of each with a view to learning lessons for delivering 
effective financing for affordable housing. they consider:
•	 France (Livret A tax privileged deposit scheme for affordable housing);
•	 United Kingdom (tHFc’s syndicated bond model);
•	 United states (low income housing tax credit);
•	 switzerland (loan and bond and public guarantee system);
•	 austria (housing construction convertible bond instrument);
•	 netherlands (social housing mortgage guarantee scheme).
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the increasing use of public guarantees is noteworthy in countries like 
switzerland, sweden, netherlands and scotland (and are now planned 
to back housing association bonds in england and Wales). this is despite 
qualms expressed in some quarters about possible market-distorting effects 
(Montague, 2012).
lawson et al. (2010, p. 2) draw conclusions from their work on financing 
models that can generate affordable housing supply. they present a 
clear sense of what should be considered in a policy framework for 
housing:
•	 a clear public vision, goals and targets for affordable housing should 
be developed from the outset so that policy is not dictated by the 
needs of private finance.
•	 private finance mechanisms can be strategic and cost-effective but 
they need to be carefully structured to fit the local institutional 
context.
•	 appropriate industry norms and an effective regulatory framework 
are essential.
•	 there needs to be an appropriate balance of demand and supply 
subsidies within a national framework with local delivery and flexibility;
•	 Government not providers should ensure low income tenants have 
their income supported to help with housing costs.
•	 Housing providers should be responsible to deliver efficient services 
and competition should play a part in keeping costs under control.
•	 income mix in schemes should be used both to integrate communities 
and use revenues creatively to support development.
the main implications drawn from this chapter’s review are:
•	 affordable housing requires subsidy, though that subsidy may take 
many forms. there are no simple market solutions that seem capable of 
producing low cost housing without subsidy. this has consequences for 
those on low incomes.
•	 the understandable efforts to develop private sector participation in new 
models, alongside the requirements they bring (for example, minimum 
rates of return and exit routes) necessarily narrows the window of what is 
possible and, for instance, makes higher rents (for example, mid-market or 
intermediate) affordable rather than social rents a necessity, which leads 
to a shallower subsidy model.
•	 private sector participation has knock-on effects elsewhere in the system, 
such as higher benefit costs (linked to higher required rents) and for 
non-profit governance (for example, for charitable housing associations 
the need to set up subsidiaries to achieve market rents but who will still 
need to justify any capital investment in such a subsidiary in terms of their 
charitable objectives).
•	 More broadly, any international policy transfer has to take proper account 
of the origin and destination of national housing systems, including their 
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interaction with the welfare benefit system and the governance and 
regulation of affordable/social housing providers.
•	 Many models and approaches exist or can be conceived, but they all have 
strengths and weaknesses when set against key policy transfer criteria 
(discussed further below).
•	 Within an articulated policy framework for affordable housing, clear aims 
and objectives are required, not just about individual policies, but also 
concerning the mix of policies and their system-level coherence, including 
how they are delivered and by whom (especially relevant to a devolved 
system).
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3 reflectIng on 
our aPProach
a number of themes warrant further elaboration. 
First, is the meaning and measurement of 
affordability – a long-standing concern heightened 
by the proliferation of different measures and 
definitions in a world that increasingly relies on 
intermediate housing propositions. We know that 
such products are often directed to those working 
yet are unable to access the market (and may 
operate with an income ceiling). it is also often 
defined in terms of a fixed length of tenancy – it 
is about terms and conditions more widely and 
not just cost discounted to a market benchmark. 
if state-funded housing investment is increasingly 
directed to this segment of the housing system 
what is to be done in terms of housing and low 
income households at the social housing end of the 
spectrum?
a second key area is methodological and concerns the possibility, risks 
and difficulties associated with international policy lesson learning and 
policy transfer (stephens, 2011a; dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Housing 
policies operate within housing systems and these in turn interact with 
wider social and economic structures (stephens, 2011a, p. 353). stephens 
defends careful housing system comparative research (including for policy 
transfer) provided we are clear about the role of a given policy’s underlying 
housing system, the relationship with path dependency and relevant 
institutions. However, this comparative dimension is not just an international 
methodological theme but also is increasingly relevant to how we think about 
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housing policies and models within a national but devolved housing system 
exhibiting important degrees of divergence in policy aims, instruments and 
delivery networks (Wilcox et al., 2010).
third, it is difficult not to conclude that there are bigger structural 
questions and wider market failures to address. We have alluded to the 
credit market failure but we also recognise long-standing supply inelasticity 
problems that create chronic market volatility and a failure to address 
high and rising levels of need (including an ageing society with insufficient 
resources to meet its growing care requirements). at the same time, the 
dysfunctional relationship between housing policy, taxation and the benefit 
system remains problematic and is exacerbated by fiscal austerity. should we 
not focus on the wider system failures and address them in order to lessen 
the constraints facing the sector? again, we will return to this longer-term 
agenda in the conclusions.
Fourth, the context and literature review suggest that we need to think 
systematically about criteria for selection of promising models and policies. 
the analysis will be organised around a common set of evaluation criteria 
or ‘tests’ (see Hall and Gibb, 2010). the criteria we envisage using would 
include:
•	 simplicity and transparency of model (for example, can stakeholders 
understand and apply the model; does it overcome critical hurdles such as 
eU state aid policy?);
•	 Whom does it house? (for example, is the policy targeted at the poorest, 
those on moderate incomes, or specific life cycle stages (for example, 
young households without assets) and how is the policy measured or 
defined?);
•	 value for money for the taxpayer and implied subsidy levels and 
distribution of risk;
•	 robustness and sustainability (that is, long-term relative insulation from 
risks and capacity to ride out economic and other ‘shocks’ over the 
duration of time required for funding);
•	 volume and the potential of policies to achieve scale;
•	 efficiency (concerned with dimensions of relative low cost, low waste, the 
avoidance of ‘dead weight’, targeted to objectives and minimisation of 
unintended consequences, for example, crowding out, or pushing prices 
up);
•	 effectiveness (that is, practical performance reaching target groups and 
alleviating housing-related problems).
of these criteria, the priorities are: scale of new supply and whether it 
reaches critical mass; the pace and certainty of deliverability of the policy; the 
nature and the depth of the subsidy implied (as there is always a subvention 
of some form) and its impact on public sector value for money; a sense of 
who is ultimately targeted and how efficiently this is delivered by the policy; 
and overall effectiveness. Where appropriate, we also consider the private 
sector’s appetite for such a policy.
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4 north aMerIca 
and australIa
overview
the analysis covers three countries, namely australia, canada and the Usa.
australia
the australian innovation example selected is the national rental 
affordability scheme (nras). it allows blending of different kinds of tenure 
and client groups within specific projects. Funds can be contested by for-
profit and non-profit providers.
the intentions: affordability, variety and competition
nras was introduced by the federal government in 2008. two periods of 
policy were envisaged, the initial roll-out from 2008–10, and then full scale 
delivery from 2010–12. the overall programme delivery horizon has now 
been extended to 2014. nras aimed to provide 50,000 rental dwellings 
over the policy period with a likely total cost to the exchequer (federal and 
state contributions combined) of close to $4.5 billion (£2.967 billion).3
nras was designed to
•	 attract the interest of institutional and other private finance into rental 
housing and do so at scale (particularly in its recent third phase). this 
would involve both non-profits, including charitable associations, and 
private investors in providing and owning housing;
•	 encourage contestability between non-profits and private landlords 
not only in ownership of rental property but in providing management 
services;
•	 provide incentives for developers and owners to blend nras with their 
own funds and with other forms of assistance arising from tax breaks, 
grants or favourable planning and planning gain arrangements.
like the low income Housing tax credit (liHtc) in the Usa, nras is based 
on a tax incentive. thus, the policy responsibility for this major housing policy 
lies partly with the australian tax office and partly with the department of 
Families, Housing, community services and indigenous affairs (FaHcsia).
the initiative was conceived as both a response to secular renter 
affordability problems and also as a contribution to stimulating demand in 
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the economy in response to the post-GFc downswing. it is aimed at key 
workers (many of them in receipt of social security – the benefit in question 
is commonwealth rent assistance (cra)) with the intention that they do not 
spend more than 30 per cent of their household income on rent. the federal 
government have identified that around 1.5 million households could be 
eligible (though this does not imply a similar total of units would be required 
to stabilise rental levels).
in order for investors and developers to be able to claim nras support 
they must offer to provide properties that can be set at no more than 80 per 
cent of market rents and that tenants have eligible income limits.4 at this 
stage of the programme it appears that its design to aid affordability for 
moderate and low-income households has been effective and that properties 
are being let readily to the intended client groups. nras has variety in its 
client group. nras support is also applicable to a broad range of property 
types. according to FaHcsia, a variety of dwelling and neighbourhood types 
are amenable to policy action within the programme.
there is also an intention to support a variety of kinds of investors. in 
many ways nras typifies forms of subsidy schemes that are emerging in the 
current times of scarce government resources, market failures in finance and 
rental service provision and, of course, unrelenting pressures across rental 
sectors. Historically, subsidy design within treasury and Finance Ministries 
has tended to favour subsidy schemes that had clearly, and often narrowly, 
designed target groups and that tended to serve a single purpose. now it has 
a broad range of possible uses, with scope for blending and matching with 
other subsidies, and gives nras-like schemes diverse and catalytic roles.
nras is a deliberately contestable subsidy (that is, it promotes 
competition between different providers, for-profit and non-profit) and it 
allows intervention across a relatively comprehensive spectrum of lower- 
and middle-income market rental provision. part of its appeal is that it is not 
narrowly targeted. as such it can be said to be a useful policy instrument for 
fostering a locally flexible approach to meeting housing needs and demands.
the nras instruments
nras involves a tax credit to private (tax-paying) investors or the payment 
of an equivalent amount of grant level to non-profit and often charitable 
affordable housing providers. in relation to private investors, the typical 
landlord in australia is a small-scale (‘mum and dad’) investor, but nras 
also aimed to attract institutional investors, not only to raise the flow of 
finance but also to ‘professionalise’ financing and management in the private 
sector. in the Us the importance of the liHtc to taxpayers/investors has 
been argued to be an important dimension of the politics of maintaining 
housing subsidies. that is, the ‘lobby’ is not simply the landlords and potential 
renters but also the savers/taxpayers who invest. the longevity of liHtc is 
often ascribed to this diversity of support. nras may not, however, yet be 
on a sufficient scale to make the ‘investor/taxpayer’ vote matter in federal 
elections.
in essence, nras offers annual incentives for ten years (indexed annually 
to the rental component of cpi.) the two key elements of the incentive are 
a commonwealth government incentive currently of $7,486 per dwelling 
per year (or £4,936.37) as a refundable tax offset or payment, and a state or 
territory government incentive, currently of $2,495 per dwelling per year (or 
£1.645.24) in direct or in-kind financial support.
this government’s support is committed for up to ten years, and this 
means that the overall value of the subsidy (given indexation) is close to 
$95,000 per unit (£62,644). nras is relatively generous to market investors. 
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to date it appears to have generated gross rental returns of close to 7 per 
cent, as opposed to a more typical market return of 5 per cent.
it needs to be stressed that the nras tax break is not only additional 
to other renter tax breaks, but also widely supplemented by other forms 
of support including (according to FaHcsia): loans; equity investments; 
capital grants by commonwealth, state and territory or local governments; 
donations by charities; free or discounted land by churches; or contributions 
by developers in accordance with planning requirements. in addition to 
this, many state and local governments have provided generous planning 
incentives where nras approved dwellings are to be built. in ex post 
evaluations of value for money in nras spending it will be essential that 
tranches of support can be co-identified with both the income of clients 
supported and with the other diverse subsidy supports applied.
Government does not hold any residual claim on the equity given to 
investors, as nras is a ‘fund and forget’ strategy. should an investor decide 
to leave the scheme there is no mechanism to reclaim the support allocated 
in earlier years. the federal government’s main roles are in allocation of 
nras permissions and state governments have continuing roles in ensuring 
that properties are let within the eligibility limits and that services provided 
meet state standards. arguably nras appears to have been designed to 
ensure speedy delivery of policy change rather than to ensure maximum 
efficiency in the delivery of policy aims.
it was noted above that the australian government had sought a variety 
of potential investors and developers in the Mras programme. in order to 
do this they not only made non-profit (non-tax paying) provider support 
available as an annual capital grant but also provided comfort that charities 
could also deliver a commercial service as long as their core aims were 
charitable. this is a flexibility in shaping the market–non-profit interface that 
has been missing in the UK, reflecting the costs of setting-up and running 
non-charitable subsidiaries. the involvement of states in making support 
in cash or kind has also been important in engaging local interest and in 
deploying planning and infrastructure programmes as ways of facilitating 
such investment.
the first waves of nras applications and developments were dominated 
by the non-profit sector. non-profits are confronted by significant new 
opportunities including:
•	 being contracted by investors to provide management services for 
participating nras dwellings;
•	 teaming up with other partners in joint ventures or consortia 
arrangements to construct and manage new dwellings;
•	 applying for nras incentives to help construct and manage dwellings 
themselves.
it is clear that nras has encouraged the formation of a new non-profit 
sector that engages in the provision of both lower-income and middle-
income rental housing and that new ‘hybrid’ organisations have evolved (see 
lawson et al., 2010; Maclennan, 2012).
policy has been modified post 2010 to raise private investment interest. 
there is no upper limit to the number of nras homes which an individual 
or organisation can own. For instance the australian national University 
in canberra has built a thousand nras homes. there is however a lower 
limit on applicants. in round three of nras FaHcsia advised that, ‘as the 
nras aims to encourage large-scale investment in affordable housing, it is 
not directly available to small-scale, private, individual investors in the rental 
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property market. direct applications can only be made by those with 1,000 
or more dwellings’ (see FacHsia website guidance: www.fahcsia.gov.au).
drill hall
the original royal Melbourne drill Hall has been completely transformed 
from a faded 1930 ‘regimental marching hall’, to a modern, high quality 
heritage restoration, civic complex and well designed social housing 
development. the project created a significant civic space as well as a 
city centre service for an aboriginal health facility. in return, council and 
the planning scheme allowed for air rights to be used for a nine-storey 
tower of 59 apartments let to a range of household types including 
people with disabilities. Housing choices australia combined capital 
grant, private debt, philanthropy, planning gain and tax concessions with 
nras to produce an integrated development in an outstanding city 
centre location. this is a ‘more than market’ example of the emerging 
integrative capacities of new providers.
With these provisions there have been a growing number of syndicates 
whereby groups of small investors commission a developer to construct 
an nras project and national efforts to market this approach have been 
significant after 2011. large-scale institutional investors have still been 
slow to participate on any scale but australian experience is similar to other 
advanced economies in this regard. there exists a strongly risk averse 
attitude on the part of institutions towards residential property.
the Mariner (newQuay)
this modern, well-designed apartment block offers housing in a 
premium city-centre location to people on fixed, low and moderate 
incomes alongside other dockside residents. it provides key workers 
with good quality housing within easy access of transport and jobs. the 
eight-storey development has 113 apartments, 85 of which are owned 
by a not-for-profit provider. twenty-eight units were sold off the plan to 
the private market – mostly for owner occupation. the $1.5m proceeds 
(£989,120) were then used as equity to cross-subsidise different 
housing needs, including people with disabilities. nras, private debt, 
equity from sales and capital grants were combined to produce dwellings 
almost half the subsidy cost of comparable public housing developments.
conclusions
in broad terms nras appears to have been a generally well-constructed 
scheme with effective outcomes, though no hard evaluation has yet been 
published. there has been substantial take up of the scheme. almost all of 
the possible permissions have been approved, though actual construction, 
understandably, is lagging. to date it appears that 15,000 units have been 
completed or are in development and it seems unlikely that all allocated 
developments will be undertaken by 2014. there is currently a lack of clarity 
about the resource commitments for the next stages of federal housing 
policy and the future of nras beyond 2014 is uncertain although there is a 
general sense that nras has been an important innovation in housing policy 
provision.
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of those who have pursued permissions and development, there has 
been a much greater preponderance of non-profit organisations than initially 
envisaged. although private interest has grown over time there has been 
more success in attracting syndicates of small investors rather than the large 
institutional investments that it had been hoped would change the financial 
and operational efficiencies of the sector. crucially, few institutional investors 
have committed, mostly because the return is still insufficient compared to 
other investment options. However, on balance, this has nonetheless been 
a useful innovation wherein the emerging not-for-profit sector has used 
the scheme to mix and blend financial inputs, explore new market segments 
(including mid-market renting) and develop new products.
We believe these are important gains for the australian housing 
system for the long term. there has been an acceleration of affordable 
middle income rental provision, place renewal has been facilitated, a 
more professional rental sector has been encouraged and there has been 
contestability and leverage in funding. the parallel development of the social 
housing initiative makes clear that nras was not seen as a substitute for 
investment in the homes of the poorest people but was, rather, a helpful 
complement relieving other market pressures.
canada
the canadian example focuses on low-cost home-ownership. canadian 
affordable housing programmes were severely reduced in the early 1990s. 
there has been little purpose-built private rental housing built since the 
1980s and ‘core housing need’ (as defined by canada Mortgage and Housing 
corporation (cMHc, 2012)) has remained high, particularly among renters, 
aboriginal people and single-parent families. access to home ownership for 
low and moderate income groups has been reduced due to price increases 
(despite low interest rates and high production in large urban centres) 
leading to renters maintaining tenancies and limiting rental opportunities for 
newly formed households. in canada home-owners require loan insurance 
and subsidised loan insurance is only available where households provide 
a deposit of at least 20 per cent of dwelling prices. this places a significant 
deposit hurdle for potential first-time purchasers albeit that it encourages 
both household saving and housing market stability.
despite the devolution of housing programmes to lower tiers of 
government in the 1990s, federal governments have subsequently passed 
bills to support ‘affordable housing provision’. in the 2008–9 package of 
fiscal stimulus measures housing was regarded a fast acting, high multiplier 
sector and a significant injection of funds was made for the two subsequent 
fiscal years. the federal government’s desire was to have a very temporary 
and simple programme with no on-going operating costs (one-time grants) 
and no on-going administration.
in order to deliver this aim, a portion of federal and matched provincial 
allocations were reserved for access to affordable home ownership. Funds 
can be in the form of a forgivable loan, grants, or a re-payable loan held as 
a silent second mortgage (payable at a point in time or on sale of the unit 
by initial occupier) to individuals. this ‘silent’ mortgage treatment is the 
significant innovation in the programme. different provinces have developed 
approaches in the use of these funds but the silent loans (ontario) measures 
funded by the affordable Housing program (aHp) form the focus of the 
discussion in the paragraphs below.
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the policy response to the GFc and the market context was to give 
some support to housing but, in contrast to the australian response, to do 
so through a simple programme with no on-going operating costs (one-
time grants) and no on-going administration commitment. the costs of 
the programme were shared between federal and provincial governments 
with further options for additional local government participation or 
augmentation. this was delivered by earmarking a portion of federal and 
matched provincial allocations for initiatives to promote access to affordable 
home ownership.
as each province, and in some cases local governments, set allocations, a 
national figure is not known, or at least not published. of the approximately 
$1.4 billion (or £889,675) allocated for the overall aHp 2011–14, it is 
estimated that 20 per cent will be used for affordable ownership housing.
spending and action were triggered when funds were allocated by 
provincial governments in responses to local government plans and 
indications of support (in cash, land or in-kind). the home ownership 
element of the aHp can be used to boost production for ownership in a 
number of ways. a capital grant can simply be made to qualifying individuals 
to provide a 5 per cent down payment to meet mortgage underwriting 
requirements. that form of support may be simple, but it is a once only aid to 
purchaser affordability with all the gains accruing to the first buyer; or it may 
be a grant contribution that is leveraged for policy purposes with added value 
from other cash and non-cash contributions (fee forgiveness, land value, 
planning approvals and labour). these contributions are then aggregated 
and held as a second mortgage that has to be repaid at some agreed date or 
upon sale of the house unless loan forgiveness is a local policy choice. the 
initial purchase price is reduced by the value of the second mortgage, but the 
fact that this is a repayable ‘silent’ mortgage rather than a grant means that 
the funds can be re-released to other qualifying entrants in the future. this is 
not a ‘fund and forget’ subsidy, in contrast to nras in australia, but one that 
can be effectively recycled. if deposit capacity rather than asset returns or 
inadequate or unstable repayment income is the policy problem in boosting 
production for ownership then this silent loan approach is an effective 
approach to the real policy question.
aside from this subsidy recycling feature the scheme has some similarities 
to the nras rental approach in australia. it targeted first time buyers in 
the thirtieth to fortieth income percentile. the grant is a singular amount 
regardless of the qualified household income or the cost and size of the 
housing unit delivered (administrative simplicity). the programme was 
open to private and non-profit housing providers. local government and 
other organisations were encouraged to add value to the programme 
through reducing development permit fees and developer charges relief, tax 
reductions of postponement, and making land available for new development 
(often with forgiven or deferred land payments by the developer). the 
approach is novel, flexible and, like nras, is aimed at mobilising and blending 
wider support.
in contrast to australia, research on housing policy spending and 
outcomes in canada after 2005 (or so) are best described as modest. the 
federal government publishes relevant information at a snail’s pace and the 
federal budget statements are far from transparent. there is little organised 
attempt by provinces to produce a bottom-up view of policy and progress in 
canada so it is often hard to track programme spending let alone evaluate 
outcomes. in relation to the overall ownership segment of aHp no national 
targets have been set. in ontario analysis of provincial documents indicate 
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that over 1,000 units have been delivered or are in production. no other 
estimates are available at this time.
conclusions
the policy has a number of important virtues. First, it has a high degree of 
intended simplicity, namely, to increase the affordable housing supply and 
create jobs; it is also simply controlled by government, financial exposure 
can be capped (by the limit on total grant available) and the size of individual 
grants can be tailored to local income profiles and market conditions. it 
could readily be adapted to ‘fit’ better with UK low-cost home ownership 
requirements.
it is, second, transparent in important respects, such as in defining the 
target group, but the proportion of programme funds dedicated to affordable 
ownership is variable and can be subject to change in ways that do not reflect 
an objective set of market or other local criteria, but rather provincial or local 
policy interests; that is, the degree of provincial/local flexibility imply that 
anticipated outcomes for each locality are different, and the process for this 
allocation is not public nor well understood.
third, the programme format allows contestability or competition 
between different kinds of providers; however, that same flexibility also 
means that some jurisdictions chose approaches that included contestability 
of funds and others not. the programme is also clearly targeted at 
households at the fortieth income percentile; however, it is a limitation that 
households must meet conventional mortgage underwriting criteria (a lesser 
test if other contributions are added to those of the programme).
the constraints of the programme are such that only moderate quality 
homes in second tier locations are produced; some see this as a programme 
virtue and others do not. local variations in the size of the grant, and indeed 
other cost reducing supports, mean that the same federal fiscal effort 
can have significantly different effects on affordability from place to place 
because of the way it interacts with local subsidy and market price variation 
and as a result is more or less generous for the end recipient.
in broad terms the policy seems to be efficient in that there is a simple 
grant mechanism, a direct contribution to housing that is produced in a 
market context, limited programme administration, and no on-going financial 
or other risk exposure for government sponsors. it is also effective and has 
produced affordable ownership housing; however, projects are slower to 
develop than pure market housing because most are delivered by non-profit 
groups that have more limited financial resources (lower risk tolerance), more 
limited access to land and must pre-sell a high proportion of units prior to 
entering into construction.
there has as yet been no published overall value for money assessment 
of the scheme. However, assessment of similar projects in canada suggests 
that income targets are achieved; that a majority of buyers have higher than 
expected down-payment contributions, and reduce their exposure very 
quickly; and that many buyers remain in the units for longer than five years.
there is not, as noted above, any clear sense of the potential ‘volume’ of 
the scheme. volume potential is limited by grant availability, land availability, 
construction costs and prevailing market conditions. in addition, competition 
for appropriately located land and construction services make it more 
challenging to meet affordability targets. this tends to push production to 
smaller units, limiting opportunities for larger families. a graduated grant by 
size of unit may be more appropriate.
in large urban markets there is a significant unmet demand for affordable 
housing in all tenure forms. particular groups attracted to the aHp home-
29north America and Australia
ownership initiative seem to be single households, large families and 
younger households. Federal government, as it now switches priorities from 
stimulus spending to deficit reduction, has already reduced its programme 
contribution. However some provinces and territories are seeking ways 
in which to promote the mechanism from within their own resources, 
for example, a new strategy for the Yukon is likely to place emphasis on a 
revolving fund of ‘silent mortgages’.
usa: the low Income housing tax credit (lIhtc)
the liHtc cannot in itself be regarded as a recent innovation. it has also 
been widely reviewed, both before and after the GFc. it is a large-scale 
and significant programme (but by no means the overall largest component 
of Us housing policy support). there is a consensus in the literature 
that its existence encourages other innovations in financing, design and 
project delivery. We also note that at least three other countries have 
assessed liHtc, the UK, canada and australia, where liHtc informed the 
development of nras. in short there are long-term properties of liHtc that 
appear positive, not least its ‘survivor’ politics, and that other countries may 
seek to emulate it but without adopting all of the quite complex apparatus 
surrounding liHtc.
the essential innovation of the liHtc was that
Unlike previous supply-side programs, which have directly provided 
or subsidized low-income housing, the liHtc program provides tax 
credits to housing developers who then sell the credits to investors 
in exchange for equity finance. investors subsequently claim the 
credits on their tax returns, making the investor a beneficiary of the 
liH credits, in addition to the housing developer or the targeted 
beneficiary of the subsidized service.
desai et al., 2011
the main features of the liHtc are that:
•	 it is a federally capped tax expenditure, which provides tax credits (reliefs) 
that investors in affordable rental housing (that meets programme 
requirements) can use to offset their federal income taxes.
•	 its aim is to assist low and moderate income households, essentially 
households with an income below 60 per cent of the (equivalised) family 
incomes of households within a given area or region.
•	 Maximum affordable rent is defined as 30 per cent of income: rents have 
to be set at affordable levels and properties let to tenants below the 
income maximums for a period of 30 years.
•	 the supply of credits, set by the Us treasury (which controls the 
programme), are then allocated to states so that local strategic priorities 
dominate spending. states allocate the supply of credits, usually through 
a competitive allocation process, to developers and they then sell the 
credits, through syndicators, to investors who use them to offset tax bills.
•	 the price paid for a tax credit depends on supply and demand conditions 
in the tax credit market. in its early phases, when investors still had a 
perception of high risk, the price of tax credits was relatively low but it 
improved significantly and peaked just prior to the GFc. recent, post 
2011, evidence suggests that credit prices have now improved to earlier 
higher (below peak) levels.
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•	 developers use the funds received to construct units with the investor 
owning a share equal to the equity invested from the tax credit sale to 
them.
•	 For-profit companies investing gain an additional tax advantage, as they 
may deduct their share of tax losses on the housing project from their 
other income tax. non-profits may also be involved as there is a legal 
requirement that at least 10 per cent of credits are set aside for their use: 
as in the case of nras in australia, the share of the programme taken 
up by non-profits is relatively large and has run between a quarter and a 
third of credits over the life of the programme.
•	 the value of the credits for a new building is 70 per cent of eligible 
construction costs (though exceptions are made in some high cost cities 
and for particular needs groups). there are significant penalties for failing 
to let houses within the income and rent compliance requirements.
How does the credit work?
When the credits are allocated to states they have considerable discretion, 
within very broad federal guidelines, to select priorities and projects to 
support. some developers use the tax credits to reduce their tax bills and 
others sell their credits to investors in exchange for equity to fund the 
construction of low-income housing. this has promoted the development 
of limited partnership between investors and developers. desai et al., 2011 
moot ‘For investors who are the limited partners in the transactions, the 
return is generally from the tax credits rather than income from the project.’ 
(p. 3)
steele (2006) describes how the credit operates for non-profits.
the non-profit developer determines whether, at the permitted rents 
and costs for the site and for construction, a project receiving tax 
credits is feasible. the developer will need to find a site, estimate the 
cost of new construction or substantial rehabilitation and determine 
whether: at the required rents, there is sufficient demand for their 
proposed housing units; syndicator is willing to sell the credits they 
might receive, and the price the credits are expected to fetch is high 
enough. the syndicator’s fees and the price of the credits determine 
the infusion of funds for the project from the tax credits. a lender, 
typically a bank, will approve the size of mortgage tentatively required, 
after taking into account the funds expected from investors buying the 
credits. the equity from these investors will leave less than half the 
cost to be financed by a mortgage and other financing. thus interest 
costs will be quite low.6
developers generally require the services of syndicators as credits 
are usually sold to many buyers, each buyer having only a limited 
amount of income tax to be offset by credits. Furthermore, only those 
confident of their liability for a substantial number of the tax credits in 
each of the ten years will find the purchase worthwhile.
steele, 2006, p. 32.
outcomes
Major outcomes of the liHtc are agreed to be that, first, the programme 
has raised investment in tax credits and has increased substantially over time 
and that the share of investment from corporations rather than individuals 
has risen significantly over time (see the australian concerns in relation to 
nras). it has generated 60,000 to 100,000 affordable housing units per 
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annum since its inception. the housing output produced has been diverse 
and more dispersed than traditional public housing outputs.
second, liHtc was disrupted by the GFc, arguably when outputs were 
most badly needed, because investor demand from credits fell as banks and 
financial institutions made losses and as the Federal national Mortgage 
association (FnMa) (known as Fannie Mae) and the Government national 
Mortgage association (GnMa) were forced, by government, to leave the 
market (desai (2011) notes how the Housing and economic recovery act, 
2008 (Hera) and american recovery and reinvestment act, 2009 (arra) 
stimulated housing output and helped restore tax credit prices post 2009).
third, it engaged non-profits and for-profit investors and revolved 
around locally driven strategies with competitive allocation processes; in 
that regard they are policy efficient. it has stimulated a range of innovative 
housing investment partnerships. non-profits, for instance, have been 
prompted into seeking additional supports to make housing available to 
the lowest income groups and in this sector are widely regarded to have 
increased output and innovation. overall, the programme has involved a 
wide range of actors and interest groups and in consequence has been able 
to command political support across the spectrum. the programme has real 
political durability.
Major reservations have been threefold. First, liHtc essentially provides 
new rental housing and it is not clear that new homes are the most efficient 
way of providing homes for the poor. second, liHtc does not reach a 
significant share of the lowest income groups or, by implication, the poorest 
neighbourhoods. However, it is the absence of complementary funding that 
prevents low income delivery. third, the process costs are relatively high, for 
instance syndication costs, and this reduces affordable housing output. these 
limitations have substance but the widespread practitioner and policy maker 
view is that the liHtc is an effective and essentially efficient programme that 
rightly lies at the core of national housing policies and local actions.
implications for the UK
What are the main lessons from this chapter for the UK? First, the models 
each represent different configurations of local and national interventions 
within federal systems of governance. the UK’s devolved system of 
government, with housing devolved but with tax and benefits reserved, is 
both similar but also different in important specifics. transferring policies that 
rely on the incentive structures and complex federal–state fiscal relationships 
– has to be thought through carefully.
second, the australian nras scheme combines scale, competition 
between different kinds of providers and encourages the blending of 
different sources of support, including private sector funds. it is not providing 
homes for the poorest in society but is playing an important affordable role 
for moderate-income households and is contributing to place development. 
in contrast to emerging policies for england, where the emergence of an 
80 per cent (of market rents) sector is likely to mean a reduction in the scale 
of more deeply subsidised social rental housing, nras has complemented an 
expanding programme of social housing provision in australia.
there are aspects of nras, such as the way it encourages competition 
between for-profit and non-profit providers that are transferable and could 
be used to improve the somewhat limited efforts to introduce such elements 
into affordable housing policies in the different parts of the UK. a critical 
role for not-for-profit providers is as a management contractor. the nras 
example indicates that it is not necessary for such opportunities to diversify 
income (and indirectly support affordable supply by generating internal 
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surpluses) to require long-term and relatively inflexible business models for 
this benefit to occur.
third, the canadian model targeted at supporting home ownership 
through a second mortgage, is more modest. in its own terms it is, however, 
well-designed, transparent, simple, encourages contestable supply between 
different types of providers. Unlike nras, it is not a ‘fund and forget’ 
mechanism. the scheme may produce moderate housing quality outcomes, 
but the repayable nature of the support means that a revolving fund exists 
for the future. Given the nature of home ownership entry pressures in many 
UK markets there is little doubt that this simple and transparent approach 
has potential for transfer and, in terms of long-run public spending, might 
be more cost effective than present low-cost home-ownership (lcHo) 
approaches in the UK.
Fourth, the desirable long-term properties of the liHtc are worth 
considering further. it has generated large volumes of affordable housing 
through the use of tax credits and the tax code, providing incentives to 
private investors to support local level affordable housing. it was adversely 
affected by the GFc, but is overcoming these difficulties. the liHtc has 
promoted contestability between different types of providers and supported 
different forms of innovative partnerships, including other sources of funds. 
it has also, however, generated a wide array of affordable and social housing 
units. it has limitations, but even so the liHtc’s record demonstrates its 
wider effectiveness. the major barrier to the spread of the liHtc to the UK 
is the reality that most of these policy targets are already met by the existing 
structure of rental programmes. liHtc is only likely to be a UK policy 
innovation, were there to be a full, large-scale review of all housing subsidy 
policy and this does not seem a likely prospect at present.
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overview
europe exhibits a wide range of housing systems. social rented housing 
is most prevalent in north-west europe and scandinavia, although it is 
delivered through a variety of landlord models, and tends to provide more 
of a ‘wider affordability’ role than the ‘safety net’ role that is now prevalent 
in the UK (stephens et al., 2002). this reflects the higher levels of poverty 
and inequality in the UK. even in countries without strong traditions of 
social rental housing, it is not uncommon to find subsidised house building 
programmes.
this chapter examines seven programmes in five countries that were 
selected from an initial list of 26 drawn from ten countries. they were 
chosen as having been successful in increasing the supply of affordable 
housing, and offering new ideas that might be transferable to the UK.
spain’s vivienda de Proteccion oficial (vPo) programme7
context
spain has one of the highest levels of owner-occupation in europe, and very 
little social housing of the type that is found in north-west europe. recent 
housing history has been characterised by the big housing boom and bust. in 
contrast to the UK this involved a building boom and bust as well as volatility 
of prices and transactions.
although the tradition of social rented housing is weak, there is a very 
strong tradition of the state promoting house building. in the Franco era a 
system of sector-specific publicly-owned banks funnelled privileged finance 
into favoured sectors, including housing (through the state mortgage bank). 
the cost of finance was lowered by the use of compulsory investment ratios 
that obliged private banks to invest a proportion of their funds in specific 
projects at administratively-set rates of return. this system survived into 
the democratic era, but was wound down in the 1980s and 1990s as the 
banking system was deregulated and the state-owned banks were merged 
and privatised.
spain’s vpo (literally ‘officially protected housing’) programmes have 
been the mainstay of the country’s affordable housing programme since 
democracy (and even then were modelled on Franco-era predecessors). 
since 1978, vpo has added more than 3 million units to the stock. the 
schemes provide a subsidy to the developer (private, public, union, etc.), 
which is then passed on, usually in the form of a mortgage, to the resident on 
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a means-tested basis. a rental version also operates. it is the combination of 
supply-side subsidy, which is then targeted into a demand-side subsidy, that 
is interesting for the UK.
description
the vpo programme has always had the twin objectives of stimulating 
economic activity through the construction industry and improving housing 
affordability. the second of these objectives is promoted in two ways: first by 
increasing the supply of housing generally and second by providing greater 
subsidies for people on lower incomes. However, around 80 per cent of the 
population would in principle qualify for some form of vpo housing.
the home-ownership element is the largest and most well-established 
part of the vpo scheme. the key subsidy is cheap land, which is usually 
provided by the municipality. developers tender to build a certain number of 
houses on the site. However, the benefit of the lower land price is diminished 
somewhat by the obligation to purchase parking and storing space from the 
developer, and these are not subsidised. the development is financed by a 
mixture of deposits from prospective purchasers (20 per cent) and banks. 
individual purchasers may gain a subsidy for the down payment, which varies 
according to income (inversely) and number of children. purchasers are 
normally selected by the developer using lists of eligible households provided 
by the municipality. However, since around 80 per cent of the population is 
eligible for basic vpo housing, developers have much freedom and exercise 
it to house better-off households, especially on developments in expensive 
areas. it is the division of the loan taken out by the developer among the 
purchasers that provides the crucial link between the supply- and demand-
side subsidy. purchasers may qualify for additional subsidies, again varying 
according to income and number of children. vpo housing may be resold at 
any time without the loss of the subsidy embedded in the land, but the other 
subsidies musts be returned in full if the property is sold within ten years. 
after 20 years, there is no obligation to return any subsidy.
a rental version of vpo exists in which land is also the most significant 
subsidy, although it is merely leased. a subsidised loan replaces the 
prospective purchasers’ down payments in the ownership model, while 
targeted loan subsidies vary according to income. For private developments 
rents are slightly below market levels. the municipality plays a greater role 
in the selection of tenants than in the case with the ownership model, with 
more narrowly specified lists of eligible households.
analysis
vpo is tried and tested over decades, and in that sense has been robust. it 
has adapted according to changing circumstances. the emphasis used to be 
on interest rate subsidy, but this has shifted towards more general price/rent 
reductions and assistance with deposits. the emphasis has also shifted away 
from merely increasing housing supply, to targeting subsidies according to 
income. it is this combination of supply-side subsidy with subsidy that is in 
some ways targeted that is attractive from a British perspective.
this flexibility may also account for the way in which vpo housing is not 
‘ghettoised’ – either in terms of residents, location or physical standards 
(which are often higher than those applied in open-market housing).
However, as the system has shifted away from the provision of privileged credit 
delivered through a highly regulated financial system to one where subsidies are 
more explicit, and finance raised within the context of a liberalised finance system, 
the scheme has lost its countercyclical character. if private finance cannot be 
raised, vpo suffers a rapid decline, as is the case now (see Figure 1).
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it is also vulnerable to the combination of administratively set prices 
within the context of one of europe’s most volatile housing markets. 
administratively set interest rates in the 1990s became unviable, when 
market rates fell way below these following spain’s exit from the european 
exchange rate mechanism. this promoted the change in subsidy structure. 
at present administratively set prices are higher than market prices in eleven 
regions. overall, the price of vpo housing has fallen from around half that 
of market housing at the peak of the boom (2007) to around 30 per cent in 
2012.
the model is relatively straightforward, although not very transparent – it 
is difficult to tell exactly how much subsidy there is, and the split between 
the developer and the occupier. similarly it is not easy to judge whether the 
scheme represents value for money. this would also depend on the cost 
of alternative schemes that do not exist. However, spanish housing policy 
overall costs a low proportion of Gdp (although it is not clear whether all 
the subsidies attached to vpo are measured in this), and housing output has 
been high. the scheme is likely to have second-order effects of lowering 
prices generally, due to increasing supply – although such impacts are 
difficult to detect in the severe boom/bust cycle that spain is experiencing.
in summary, vpo has been a large-scale programme, founded on a high 
level of private sector appetite. vpo provides a shallow – though variable – 
subsidy, now primarily in the form of land. While not targeted at the poorest, 
subsidies have become more targeted over time.
denmark’s national building fund8
context
at around 20 per cent, denmark has a similar-sized social rented sector 
to that of the UK. almost all social rented housing is supplied by housing 
associations, which are characterised by high levels of tenant control at the 
estate level.
the basic funding model is similar to that which was adopted in the UK in 
the late 1980s. new housing is financed in part by a capital grant (typically 
14 per cent), but mostly by a private sector loan (typically 84 per cent). there 
are three important differences, however. First, a small tenant contribution 
(2 per cent) is required. second, the municipality guarantees the loan; and 
third, there is also a revenue subsidy paid in the earlier years of the loan to 
smooth out rental payments.
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
vpo owner
vpo rental
vpo total
Market
total
source: country expert
figure 1: housing starts (2005–11)
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an important contextual difference is that denmark has one of the 
lowest levels of income poverty and inequality in europe, and related to this, 
housing associations house a broader section of the population than is the 
case in the UK.
denmark’s social rented sector shares another important similarity to the 
UK’s. it is relatively mature, and is therefore tending to generate surpluses. 
england has experienced 20 years of controversy with the treatment of 
Hra surpluses which has been resolved, at least for the time being, with 
the redistribution of housing debt as a one-off (though probably not final) 
settlement.
the existence of a housing association ‘building fund’ in denmark is 
therefore of great interest. Having been established in the 1960s, they have 
a history, and may provide some clues as to whether they could play a role in 
the UK as a means of ensuring investment in the social sector, including for 
new housing.
description
the national Fund for non-profit Housing associations (Landsbyggefonden 
(lBF)) was established in 1967 to equalise rents between properties with 
different underlying debt profiles, but has since grown to promote the 
financial autonomy of third sector housing. its day-to-day governance is 
the responsibility of a nine-member board, which includes representatives 
of the housing associations, tenants and the two largest municipalities. its 
independence is limited as its budget has to be approved by the responsible 
government minister.
contributions are made as part of the rent to reduce anomalies arising 
from underlying debt profiles of estates. additional contributions arise 
from rents collected from debt-free properties. For properties built before 
1999, two-thirds of the surplus goes to the lBF; for those built afterwards 
all surpluses between the thirtieth and thirty-sixth year are captured and 
then they are divided evenly between three accounts. one of these counts 
is used to pay for the modernisation of dwellings; another to support area 
regeneration; and a third is intended to support new build. However, it is not 
expected to start to receive funds in any volume until around 2013.
in principle, the danish system offers a mechanism for ‘revolving door’ 
finance. However, the fund intended for regeneration was effectively run-
down in the 2000s to compensate for reductions in government subsidy for 
new build. new build is financed by a mixture of a mortgage, a capital grant 
and a small tenant contribution. a revenue subsidy from central government 
has also helped to ease costs in the early years of a development. the 
government cut this contribution dramatically after 2002, with the balance 
being made up from the lBF (see table 1). However, the funds have been 
accounted for until 2018–20, confirming that the policy was of limited 
sustainability.
analysis
lBF is more than a ‘revolving door’ mechanism. in principle, it is attempting 
to act as a national rent pool to even out rents between new and old 
properties, as a reserve for long-term renovation and increasingly as a 
source of development finance to replace government subsidy. However, the 
latter had limits as the account was run down in a few years.
the experience suggests that ultimately there is no way of preventing 
governments cutting subsidies to housing, and it is not absolutely clear 
whether the existence of lBF facilitated a cut in subsidy, or whether it 
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protected the sector from a cut in subsidy that would have happened anyway 
– or something in between.
Figure 2 suggests that it is not straightforward to read too much into the 
levels of third sector approvals. the collapse in 2007 was due to costs rising 
above a maximum, and levels recovered rapidly after that.
interestingly, the fund has not prevented housing from being highly 
politicised. the use of funds to support construction was deeply opposed 
by tenants’ organisations and by left-wing political parties, in much the 
same way that using Hra surpluses to pay for housing allowances was 
controversial in england.
nonetheless, the danish system keeps initial subsidy within the social 
housing system, and has been used to limit future taxpayer commitment. 
in some respects the fund also marks a good deal of continuity in housing 
policy. the fund has existed for 45 years, and the establishment of the 
construction element after 1998 implies looking forward for a similar period. 
in principle the fund is a model of sustainability – with a maturing sector 
providing funds for renovation and new build. the fund was run down very 
quickly, however, when the government chose to do so. even if government 
is excluded from the operation of a similar fund, it is difficult to see how the 
government cannot in effect force it to be run down (by cutting subsidy).
table 1: financial conditions for third sector housing development in denmark
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figure 2: approvals for construction 2000–10
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it is interesting to note that in denmark the funds are judged to lack 
transparency and simplicity. the incorporation of several objectives into 
the funds may have contributed to the complexity. it is possible that a fund 
operating on the same principles could be designed to be more transparent 
and simpler.
in summary, the idea of a building fund to capture sector surpluses is a 
mechanism that has to be built up over many years. then it is capable of 
complementing, not fully replacing, government subsidy – otherwise it will 
be run down quite quickly. the fund is not especially geared towards levering 
in private finance, but does contribute to mainstream social rented housing.
Ireland’s rental accommodation scheme (ras)9
context
ireland has one of the highest levels of home-ownership in europe. the 
promotion of home-ownership has been still more vigorous than in the UK. 
the most recent housing market cycle has been more violent than in the UK, 
and, as in spain, was combined with a house building boom and bust.
the social rented sector is somewhat smaller than in the UK. 
consequently, the private rented sector plays a vital role in housing low-
income households. small-scale amateur landlords dominate this sector, as 
in the UK. the irish housing allowance operates in a somewhat different way 
to in the UK. Known as ‘rent supplement’ (rs) it is limited to unemployed 
private sector tenants. thus it is only an ‘out-of-work’ benefit in contrast 
to UK Housing Benefit which is both an in-work and out-of-work benefit. 
the ras was a response to rising costs of rs. since costs per claimant rose, 
there was evidence that rs inflated rents. it was also felt that the private 
rented sector was offering a poor deal for some tenants in terms of quality 
and location; and the structure of rs was also believed to deter employment 
(since eligibility ends abruptly if a claimant gets a job). the ras was piloted in 
2005/6.
description
the ras applies to unemployed people who live in the private rental sector 
and have received rs for 18 months, that is, are long-term unemployed. 
at this point, the local authority reviews the case and inspects the 
accommodation. if its quality is adequate, and the landlord is willing to co-
operate, the tenant may be transferred into the ras scheme in situ. if the 
quality is not high enough, or the landlord does not wish to participate then 
the local authority seeks alternative suitable accommodation in the local 
authority, housing association or private sector.
in the case of the private sector, the local authority aims to negotiate an 
agreement with a private landlord to lease the accommodation for up to ten 
years in return for a discounted rent, which is 8 per cent lower than the market 
rate. in return the local authority takes responsibility for letting the property 
and collecting the rent. if the property becomes void, the local authority still 
pays the rent. the landlord retains responsibility for maintenance. rent reviews 
are built into the lease, as are arrangements for ending it.
Meanwhile the tenant no longer receives rs. instead they pay a 
contribution to the rent that varies inversely with income. this is calculated 
in the same way as differential rents in the local authority sector. this feature 
ends the ‘cliff edge’ of immediate cessation of rent assistance should the 
tenant gain employment. the scheme is financed by central government, but 
savings are ring fenced and used to finance social housing.
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analysis
a key test of ras is whether it is able to deliver private rented accommodation 
of an acceptable quality more cheaply than is the case with tenants agreeing 
contracts and receiving rs. a 2009 study (doeHlG, 2009) found that 
market rents on ras properties of a similar size were let significantly below 
market rents in the vast majority of cases. this was especially notable in 
dublin – and within dublin the greatest savings were on larger properties – 
31 per cent on three- or four-bedroom properties compared to 12–18 per 
cent on one- and two-bedroom properties. Where properties were let at 
above market rents this was attributable to the lack of supply of certain 
property types – for example, small properties in rural areas.
the most comprehensive analysis suggested that rents were higher on 
ras properties compared to rs properties of a similar size, but that the 
difference was attributable to higher quality (coates and silke, 2011). the 
study found that the net present cost of providing ras properties over a 
20-year period is significantly cheaper than rs in the vast majority of cases. 
the savings are greatest for larger properties (that is, those with three or 
more bedrooms) and outside cities. this finding was predicated on there 
being no major change to rs during this period.
compared to social rented housing, ras may be more cost effective, 
since tenancies are not for life – although they also provide greater security 
than is the case in the private rented sector outside the scheme. the better 
quality and security attributes of ras housing compared to the rest of the 
private rented sector are suggestive of good value for money. the scheme 
may also have the effect of lowering rents more general in the private rented 
sector, although this has not been shown to be the case.
the key to the scheme’s success lies in the ability of local authority staff 
to negotiate rents with private landlords. such skills are not common in the 
public sector. in the irish case, consideration was given to providing financial 
incentives to local authorities to be effective in negotiating rents by allowing 
them to keep a share of the savings. However, this was dropped on grounds 
of complexity.
in summary, the scheme has facilitated better value for money for the 
government, while generally providing a better deal for private tenants. the 
scheme depends on private sector buy-in, which has clearly been achieved 
– see Figure 3. the scheme is well-targeted on lower income households, 
the main disadvantage being that it does not directly contribute to increasing 
supply overall. However, it was not designed to do this.
figure 3: ras outputs (end 2005–end 2010)
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the dutch guarantee fund and central funds10
context
around one-third of households in the netherlands live in housing 
association properties, making it the largest social rented sector in europe. it 
is the legacy of a large state-sponsored social building programme. However, 
as in many other countries, once the large shortages in housing had been 
met, the state looked for ways in which it could reduce its involvement in 
housing. in 1995 housing associations were given financial autonomy when 
the state effectively wrote off outstanding debt in return for no further 
subsidies.
Financial autonomy was built on two institutions that were established in 
the 1980s: the central Fund for social Housing (cFv); and the Guarantee 
Fund for social Housing (WsW). cFv is the first defence against financial 
difficulties by supervising the sector and supporting housing associations 
that become financially distressed. the second line of defence is WsW, which 
guarantees housing association loans. the third and final line of defence is 
the government.
description
WsW is a guarantee fund established in 1983, with the status of a 
private foundation. Housing associations seeking private finance to fund a 
development (new buildings or renovation of existing ones) are subject to a 
number of checks by WsW. these include a financial check to ensure that 
the dwellings will yield sufficient rental income to repay the loan, and that the 
dwellings are of sufficient technical quality. a minimum solvency requirement 
of 5 per cent is needed when loans are sought to fund new housing 
or property acquisitions. Housing associations also pay a fee to WsW 
connected to each loan that is guaranteed. Until recently the municipality 
had to agree to act as a backstop for each loan relating to investment within 
its boundaries. However, there has been a tendency to move away from 
project-specific guarantees towards generic ones. in turn this has led to 
the withdrawal of municipalities from guaranteeing new loans (since 2010). 
However, they continue to act as guarantors on loans taken out before 
2010.
WsW guarantees some €85 billion of loans (£71.162 billion)11 and 
has a reserve of €85 billion (2010). its annual operating costs were about 
€9 million (or £7.5 million) in 2010. there have been no claims on WsW in 
its (almost) 30-year history although the largest housing association, vestia 
triggered a crisis when treasury management associated with interest rate 
swaps went badly wrong.12 the government guarantees are treated as state 
aids.
WsW delivers triple a ratings for housing association loans that are 
guaranteed through it, and it claims that this translates into monthly rents 
that are €35 (£29.30) lower than they would otherwise be.
cFv is a public body, established in 1988, that supervises housing 
associations and produces annual reports on every housing association in the 
netherlands. clearly the supervisory role is intended to reduce the risk that 
a housing association might encounter financial difficulties. However, csv 
can intervene in two types of situation: (a) where there is a cost over-run 
in a particular project that causes financial distress; and (b) where there is a 
general financial problem that threatens the viability of a housing association.
direct financial assistance in the form of interest-free loans or subsidies 
is relatively uncommon and has occurred only twice since 1983. More 
commonly cFv facilitates re-organisations, especially mergers between 
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weaker and stronger housing associations. such interventions have occurred 
18 times since 1983. the most common model is that the financially strong 
housing association takes over the financially troubled one.
the procedure can be quite protracted. Before a housing association can 
receive support from cFv it must demonstrate that it has done everything 
possible to resolve its problems and explored alternative solutions. it needs to 
consult with third parties, including WsW and municipalities, whose approval 
is required in the event of a large-scale merger.
Fees from its members fund cFv. in 2011, cFv had a reorganisation 
fund of ca. €118 million (£98.79 million) and provided a loan of €39 million 
(£32.65 million) to facilitate the merger of a weak housing association 
with one judged to be stronger. its fee income was ca. €56 million 
(£46.88 million). operating costs were € 7 million (£5.86 million).
analysis
WsW and cFv provide relatively simple products that appear to have 
worked well over a long period of time. although the state acts as a backstop 
in the case of WsW, both mechanisms have acted in the spirit of ‘solidarity’ 
within the housing association sector. so far housing associations are bound 
together in a common interest to protect their triple a ratings that facilitates 
access to low cost funds.
in summary the dutch funds represent mechanisms that were introduced 
into a maturing social sector. they are (more or less) universal, facilitate 
private sector appetite in the housing association sector, which continues to 
house a relatively broad range of households.
the german use of tax incentives for private landlords13
context
Germany has the lowest level of home-ownership in the european Union 
and the largest private rented sector. its housing market is also remarkably 
stable, as is the policy context. like many other countries, Germany 
embarked on a large-scale building programme in the 1950s, but unusually 
social renting was defined by the receipt of subsidy rather than by provider. 
thus private landlords have been among the many providers of ‘social’ rented 
housing, this status placing restrictions on whom can be housed and the 
rents that can be charged for the duration of a subsidised loan. once this has 
been repaid, the housing ceases to be ‘social’ rented, and instead becomes 
‘private’ rented. this phenomenon accounts for the decline of the ‘social’ 
rented sector, which is now below 5 per cent of the stock, and is continuing 
to decline.
the German private rented sector has been regarded as a successful 
stabilising force, and a means of making the housing market as a whole 
more affordable. even the segment without bricks-and-mortar subsidy 
brings with it security and second-generation rent controls. the sector has 
benefited from three principal tax privileges: a degenerative depreciation 
allowance until 2005 (since when it has been linear); the ability to set losses 
against other income (‘negative gearing’); and capital gains tax exemption for 
properties held for more than ten years
description
the depreciation allowance for newly built houses was introduced in 1949 
with the aim of increasing supply at a time of acute shortage. Until 2005, 
the allowance was designed to be ‘degenerative’, so the initial allowance was 
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reduced over time, so bringing the benefits forward. the allowance rates 
were subject to frequent adjustment (and indeed were withdrawn for several 
years in the 1970s). the depreciation allowance is applied to the building 
costs (or value) of the property excluding the value of the land. the cash flow 
is taken to be the rent less mortgage interest payments. the depreciation 
allowance (that is, percentage of the building value) is deducted from the 
cash flow, and has the effect of reducing the landlord’s tax liability at their 
marginal tax rate. in the early years, the depreciation allowance could have 
the effect of making the tax liability negative. after 2005, the ‘degenerative’ 
depreciation allowance was replaced with a linear allowance (set at 2 per 
cent, or 2.5 per cent for old buildings), that is, one whose rate remains the 
same
analysis
it is difficult to assess the extent of the impact of the tax regime on the 
supply of new private rented housing. the number of new private rented 
dwellings completed without ‘social’ subsidy in Western Germany between 
1960 and 1995 has been estimated at 6 million, representing 2.8 per 1,000 
inhabitants over the whole period. nor is there a straightforward relationship 
between the tax system and supply. For example, supply continued to fall 
after the depreciation allowance was reintroduced in 1978 (having been 
suspended in 1973). certainly, the tax incentives should have contributed 
to new supply, but the extent to which they fed through into new supply 
or lower rents would depend on the relative price responsiveness of supply 
and demand. Moreover, the combination of degenerative depreciation 
allowance and negative gearing was justified, in part, as compensation for 
rent regulation and security of tenure.
a powerful argument against tax incentives such as these is that they are 
regressive and poorly targeted. the better off will tend to benefit from them 
as landlords. similarly, quite well off tenants will also benefit. the core issue 
seems to be that the system could be justified in the 1950s when Germany 
faced a huge housing shortage, but it would be much harder to justify today, 
except in so far as they are needed to counteract the disincentives arising 
from rent regulation and tenure security. Where regional or local housing 
shortages exist, supply might be more effectively encouraged by subsidy 
instruments that can be better targeted, such as grants.
in summary, the tax treatment of private landlords in Germany has 
been part of a housing policy geared towards a strong supply side that has 
arguably limited the need for large-scale direct provision by the state. in 
doing so it has not been targeted, and forms part of a long-term strategy.
Implications for the uk
the five case studies raise a number of issues for UK innovation in the 
financing of affordable housing supply.
•	 the spanish vpo scheme, long-established, has shifted away from 
merely increasing housing supply, to targeting subsidies according to 
income. it is this combination of supply and demand-side subsidies that is 
attractive from a British perspective. it is flexible (though not completely 
transparent) but has suffered in the recent downturn as a result of losing 
its counter-cyclical quality (as it is now more reliant on private sector 
input) and is vulnerable to house price risk. the scheme is, however, 
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readily transferable (it would not require new institutional infrastructure) 
and could support construction stimulus activity.
•	 the danish housing association surplus building fund is a well-established 
programme operating in a relatively similar model to post-1988 UK 
housing associations. there are institutional governance and autonomy 
issues to resolve over how any such fund is managed – but nothing 
insurmountable. denmark’s case shows that internal funds can replace 
scarce public subsidy for construction and that there can be indirect 
ownership over fund disposition. a more transparent scheme perhaps 
with limited contributions could be allowed to build up something useful 
for the UK or devolved context and could be a revolving fund.
•	 irish long lease (ras) properties appear to offer quality-adjusted lower 
rents than the market and are cost-effective in that the leases, while 
longer than market tenancies, remain shorter than average social tenure 
tenancies. there are local versions of long leases in the UK, particularly 
in scotland as part of the arrangements for implanting its homelessness 
legislation, but it is not clear that the negotiated lower rents have been 
achieved on anything like the same scale. of course the ras scheme 
does not increase the supply of new housing, but does increase the 
quantity and quality of housing available for social purposes.
•	 concerning the dutch guarantee and funds, we argued above that the 
housing association sector has historically achieved similar credit ratings, 
scale and access to funds without the need for these formal mechanisms. 
However, as we have argued elsewhere in this report, there is a sense 
of a creeping move slowly towards key elements of the dutch system, 
again highlighted by the recent announcement guaranteeing £10 billion 
of social housing investment. it is also not clear that the major developing 
housing associations are convinced of the virtues of dutch ‘solidarity’.
•	 German tax advantages may be an important reason for the much envied 
long-term stability of the German housing system. However, while some 
of the principles could be applied, the German principles of taxation look 
quite different institutionally, the tax incentives are not necessarily well-
targeted and other forms of effective subsidy may remain more effective 
in a UK context. nonetheless, the German case does suggest that there 
is merit in considering tax incentives, especially if they can be traded-off 
with greater tenure security or longer leases. there are obvious links to 
the irish long lease model discussed earlier.
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overview
determining the UK policies is not straightforward. Further pragmatic 
decisions have to be made about eligibility. First, there are existing 
policies that are in place and will expand affordable supply but have limited 
transferability or are restricted by financial capacity (for example, the aHp). 
second, there are policies operating comparatively successfully in one 
jurisdiction that would not work in another (for example, scottish council 
building with grants and prudential loans would be inhibited by borrowing 
caps in england). third, there is divergence between different party political 
outlooks across the UK, albeit one functioning within a shared broad housing 
system, and economic and fiscal context.
Below, we set out a number of policies actively being discussed or in place 
that have potential for cross-fertilisation from one part of the UK to another, 
policies that could augment affordable supply across the housing system. 
thus, we combine actual policies with others that are still to be established. 
We have also grouped a further set of related policies under one heading. 
even if they do not all ‘work’ according to our criteria, there may still be the 
elements of a given idea worth pursuing.
the UK material reflects the current and likely future fiscal context 
and is also sensitive to devolved arrangements. in that sense it is closer to 
attempting to work with the present system than, as we saw earlier with the 
proposals from ippr and policy exchange, proposing reforms that mean 
upturning large parts of the system. nonetheless, we do return in the final 
chapter to the bigger picture of wider housing system failure and long-term 
policy development.
the starting point is the search for more affordable supply, where capital 
subsidy is substantially reduced (and may be entirely eliminated in the future), 
borrowing capacity is limited, and both banking regulation and balance sheet 
restructuring are adversely affecting the terms and conditions of lending, but 
where, at the same time, rents on new affordable supply will be constrained 
by the reform of housing benefit. Moreover, the increased use of capital 
markets is also not unlimited – nHF (2012) point out that there is a small 
number of institutions who purchase social provider bonds, but their long-
term demand is unclear and there will be competition in the future from 
councils (let alone uncertainty created by wider global financial concerns). 
partnerships with the private sector and other parties will combine to raise 
the necessary capital through debt and in some cases equity to make the 
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risks, returns and governance acceptable such as to generate the affordable 
supply. in what follows, we look at models and financing innovations that 
would allow this balancing act to be achieved, though we also consider 
innovations with respect to low cost home ownership.
social real estate investment trusts (reIts)
description and background
real estate investment trusts (reits) are financial entities organised to 
provide a tax-transparent way of investing in real property. established 
in 2007 in the UK, and provided that the trust is primarily involved in 
the business of renting housing (at least 90 per cent of rental profits is 
returned to shareholders), a residential reit may provide an efficient 
route for institutions to invest in rented housing (since the reit is thereby 
exempt from corporation tax which acts as an incentive to the tax-exempt 
institutions – see nHF, 2012, p.3). Yet, to date, this has not happened and, 
instead, reits in the UK have typically emerged from the conversion of 
existing property businesses. Financial institutions have been unable to find 
the scale of business they want, nor the necessary returns (known as the 
yield gap).
reits have attractions to the social and affordable sector both in terms of 
raising funds (and funds that can be recycled) and in providing a management 
contract and continuing ownership interest (depending on how the reit 
is structured). Many from the sector have argued that the management 
expertise and scale economies offered make them an obvious partner 
for private investors. there is a strong ‘sale and leaseback’ theme to this 
investment model. in 2007 a number of major associations did try to initiate 
an Ha reit, proposing a £259 million investment and opening discussion 
with the private sector – but it did not go forward (nHF, 2012).
earlier in 2012, HM treasury announced a consultation which would 
investigate the scope for a social (more accurately an affordable housing) 
reit which hoped to draw on the scale economies of the housing association 
sector, index-linked rents, the security of housing benefit and low rent 
arrears to (perhaps) provide a sufficient return that might tempt the 
institutions. at the same time, associations, having sold properties into a reit 
and thereby accessing funds to build more social or affordable housing, might 
expect to hold the management contract for the reit properties.
nHF (2012) sets outs two variants on the social reit model:
•	 Housing associations sell part of their existing stock to a stock exchange 
listed company (the reit) who in turn raise more capital from investors. 
the subscription funds could either repay the associations or buy further 
tranches of stock from them. the social landlords are likely to retain the 
management contract and/or a significant equity stake in the reit, which 
would provide ongoing income and allow a degree of control over the 
management of the property.
•	 in evidence to the dclG select committee (HcclG, 2012), places for 
people suggested an alternative mode. initially, the reit purchases 
5,000 existing rented properties from the social landlord. the funds 
thus generated by the sale would be used to finance additional new 
development in affordable and market rented categories, and once 
occupied these would be sold into the reit – and this process could be 
repeated several times.
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analysis
perhaps the critical question is whether or not these new vehicles will 
generate returns that can overcome the yield gap that appears to exist. nHF 
(2012), following Williams et al. (2011) and the dclG select committee 
report (HcclG, 2012) observe that institutions typically require a 7 per cent 
yield on their investment but returns performance for residential investment 
in england has averaged only 3.5 per cent. However:
recent volatility in the financial markets and diminished opportunities 
for such a high level of return on investment has resulted in an 
increased appetite for lower yield but more secure returns. this 
includes an interest in long leased properties, preferably with index-
linked rent as liability-matching assets.
Williams et al., 2011, p. 4
HM treasury shares this belief (see their consultation document). nHF think 
that if a return of 5–6 per cent can be achieved, that would be sufficient 
for investors to participate in a social reit, given management efficiencies, 
housing benefit and high demand. it remains to be seen whether long-term 
returns below 7 per cent are genuinely acceptable and under what kinds of 
conditions. For example, is the working assumption that housing associations 
will hold management contracts in the long term generally valid when 
investment fund managers are chasing target returns and could choose to 
exercise exit clauses?
there are a series of further issues:
•	 concerns have been raised about the specific feature of the 90 per cent 
distribution rule, as housing assets require dedicated or sinking funds for 
maintenance.
•	 a similar issue is that the reit model arguably does not acknowledge 
sufficiently the holding investment nature as opposed to a trading 
business. there have been corresponding calls to reform (even abolish) 
the stamp duty land tax regime applying to reits.
•	 there is uncertainty also about how much appetite the funds have for 
this type of activity. though it is not limited to them only – what about 
retail market and individual investors and, for example, the sips pension 
market and isas? However, there is no denying the immaturity of a new 
investment product and the instability of the market.
•	 a further series of technical governance issues concern grant embedded 
in the original stock sold to the reit and the sale of charitable assets into 
a for-profit company. there will also need to be adequate guarantees to 
protect both new and existing tenants.
•	 the supposed income indexation that is commonly seen to be an 
important feature of the model is not perfect since the assumed uplift in 
affordable rents is linked to market rents rather than rpi.
•	 reits are off balance sheet and involve equity rather than debt and this 
is promoted as a mechanism that does not weaken borrowing capacity in 
the way that private debt finance has done through gearing, meeting loan 
covenants and provision of adequate security (it is the latter that rapidly 
erodes borrowing capacity according to the nHF (2012)). However, the 
act of selling property into the reit will itself affect the landlord gearing 
calculation, the security they can make available and their lender covenant 
compliance.
•	 looking at the social reit model it was noted that it resembles a form of 
sale and leaseback model with a capital sum generated by the initial sale 
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of assets into the trust (possibly augmented by an equity position in the 
trust) and the scope for a management contract as a source of revenue. 
derwent living have recently set up such a sale and leaseback model 
with aviva calculated on a 50-year lease based on an index-linked 4 per 
cent annual fee and the properties reverting to derwent at the end for 
a nominal sum. For this, they received something of the order of £40–
45 million (nHF, 2012). However, while sale and leaseback may work 
in certain contexts, nHF considers the model to be ‘usually on balance 
sheet, relatively inflexible and slightly more expensive than debt and will 
still deplete association borrowing capacity’ (p. 9).
social reits are an unknown quantity – they evidently have several hurdles 
to negotiate, but if the appetite to invest is genuine there are gains to be 
made for associations to participate and it would by definition generate 
additional funds. However, as the disappointing experience of residential 
reits since 2007 indicates, it is not clear that the yield gap can be closed, 
nor that the various governance, scheme design and taxation question marks 
can be resolved, other than for a few limited special cases. as a footnote 
– in the autumn of 2012, the coalition government indicated that, after 
consultation evidence was reviewed, they would not be promoting the 
development of social reits at this time.
Partnership models
Background
a number of partnership models involving different subsidy routes, private 
sector participation and combinations of affordable and social rent have 
emerged in recent years. Here, we limit the discussion to three specific 
examples.
National Housing Trust Initiative (Scotland)
the national Housing trust initiative (nHt) model emerged as the first 
substantial output from the scottish Futures trust, set up by the first snp 
government as a not-for-profit alternative to pFi. in part a solution to 
unsold partly completed private sector sites, the original nHt model was 
based on a joint venture between councils and private developers. Funded 
by loans from the councils, alongside private sector loan finance and equity, 
this joint venture offers intermediate rented property with starting rents 
for the first let of each nHt home being set at or below local housing 
allowance ceilings. after five to ten years the properties will be sold, with the 
sales proceeds being used to repay loans, recoup any calls on the scottish 
government guarantee (see below) and potentially earn a return to the 
private sector on its equity investment. the principal risks to the council 
partner – void loss reducing rent and capital loss on resale – are covered 
by a scottish government guarantee (typically priced at around £2,500 per 
unit). the first round of procurement under the original model is delivering 
over 600 affordable units across scotland. a second round of procurement 
is underway and the initiative has also been expanded with the introduction 
of a version specifically for housing associations, which includes flexibility for 
participating housing associations to retain stock indefinitely.
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national housing trust round 1
the first round of procurement of the original nHt model for councils 
and private developers is delivering over 600 affordable homes for rent 
across the following council areas (scottish Government website):
aberdeen city 41
city of edinburgh 422
Falkirk 27
Highland 57
stirling 16
Borders 51
although the council loans are for up to ten years and are guaranteed – they 
do have an impact on overall council borrowing capacity. thus, there are 
limits to the extent of this kind of initiative and there will be locations where 
it would not work, either for mid-market rent demand reasons or because of 
insufficient borrowing capacity given the other things councils wish to invest 
in. However, it should also be noted that this type of project enables councils, 
who have disposed of their landlord function through stock transfer, to 
become housing providers once more, albeit in partnership with the private 
sector and the scottish Futures trust.
Rettie’s Resonance (Scotland)
the scottish property company rettie’s proprietorial resonance model 
is established with several social landlords across scotland. it works by a 
developer selling new properties for affordable rent to a social landlord 
but with land costs deferred till the properties are ultimately sold on after 
a period of years. the added value is that the social landlord will keep a 
minority share of the units in perpetuity. the risks to the housing association 
are reduced, for example, in the edinburgh-based project by a fixed rental 
risk contingency provided through city of edinburgh council’s affordable 
housing funding and agreed with the scottish government.
the rettie’s resonance model in principle
clarke (2011, pp. 10–11) provides a worked example of the model. 
the model is based on occupancy risk. For illustration, assume that 
the developer builds the units and sells them to the registered social 
landlord (rsl) for £80,000 per unit (deferring the land element which 
is effectively the investment component for the developer). the rsl 
funds this with a ten-year loan secured on the future income stream 
and then lets the properties it now owns at mid-market rent. critically, 
the developer retains a call option to sell 13 vacant units (out of 15) 
over the ten years, whereby sales proceeds generate a return on the 
deferred land element and repays the rsl’s debt on the units sold. 
Here, two out of 15 units remain in perpetuity with the rsl. several 
developers and housing associations are currently pursuing the 
mechanism with retties.
Unlike the nHt, where the units must remain available for rent for five years, 
the resonance model allows for the private investor to retain the right to 
reimburse the housing association and sell the homes at any time (subject 
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to existing tenancy agreements). in return for this mechanism, that allows 
for the early release of capital in this way, a proportion of units are retained 
by the rsl in perpetuity for no more than the build cost. the permanent 
affordable nature of these retained units may in fact help persuade otherwise 
reluctant councils who do not want to pursue the original nHt models for 
councils and private developers that other models of mid-market rent like 
resonance might better meet their local affordable housing requirements 
(Field et al., 2012).
Welsh affordable homes limited liability partnership (Wales)
the Welsh Housing partnership combines public funding (government grant), 
support from a number of Welsh housing associations and loans from the 
principality building society. an example of the approach, creating special 
purpose vehicle is the ely Bridge scheme in cardiff, which will generate 700 
new homes, 400 of which will be at social or affordable rent levels (see box).
ely bridge, cardiff
ely Bridge is a vacant brown field (contaminated) site, a former paper 
mill on 56 acres. the project was initiated by principality building society 
and would involve 300 units for sale, 300 intermediate rent and 100 
for social rent, as well as a school, offices for rent and a riverside park in 
cardiff. the affordable housing will be managed by a community-based 
housing association with rents at or below local housing allowance 
ceilings. the project would not involve housing grant but does involve 
cheap public land and a £6 million repayable loan. instead, its innovative 
financing and ownership model would be based around a not-for-
profit social enterprise company that would develop the site formed 
as a partnership between the Welsh government and the principality 
building society. a repayable loan from the Welsh government’s 
economic stimulus Fund will help with decontamination. the proposal 
would see the company wound up on the final stage of development 
and the properties transferred into an investment company who would 
in turn lease the rental component to a social landlord who would 
manage and insure the properties. profits on the sale of land for 
open market sales would be reinvested either in other sites for social/
affordable housing or to help increase the volume of the model.
analysis
these different models have common threads, including:
•	 partnership between central and/or local government with the private 
sector, either developers and/or lenders;
•	 partnership vehicles that may or may not take the operation off balance 
sheet;
•	 deferred or subsidised land as a key element of investment by one of the 
parties (often the public sector but can also be private as in the deferred 
land cost case of resonance);
•	 a large if not completely affordable rent element often linked to local 
housing allowance levels;
•	 the use of soft loans, local government loans or full-scale embedded 
partnership from the mutual lender (as in the case in Wales).
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Furthermore, the nHt is linked to state-backed guarantees (central 
government) which protect the not-for-profit or state partners from 
occupancy or sales risk while the first resonance projects in edinburgh 
included a fixed rental risk contingency provided through city of edinburgh 
council’s affordable housing funding (agreed with scottish Government).
the key role of housing associations as managers (as is envisaged for 
phase two of the nHt in scotland) including their embedded role in local 
communities where the programmes can be linked to area regeneration 
efforts, such that the short timescale of intermediate rental and its eventual 
sell-off, has to be set against the partnership’s long-term vision for the area 
and community.
Finally, while it is the case that most properties will be sold on to help the 
private sector recoup its investment, this need not be the case, as we saw 
with the resonance model – Field et al. (2012) found that many of the mid-
market rent affordable projects analysed for their evaluation of the scottish 
housing improvement Fund were long-term investments that did not have 
an ‘expiry date’.
a key issue for all mid-market or intermediate affordable rent schemes 
is underlying demand. reliable general evidence is scarce about the depth 
of demand, but there is evidence emerging from local area studies (though 
this is patchy and certainly not consistently investigated). What is clear is 
that where there is little gap between market and social rents there will be 
less scope for the mid-market to flourish. However, in some markets where 
housing costs are relatively affordable, for example, in Glasgow, recent 
evidence suggests that, potentially, demand is strong for an intermediate 
product (evans and littlewood, 2012).
these schemes reflect a combination of willing partners coming together 
to address specific local needs through tailored solutions drawing on central 
and local government assistance as well as private sector wherewithal. some 
of the governance difficulties that have been identified with other forms of 
innovation have been overcome through the use of special purpose vehicles, 
yet it is clear, if one looks at the nHt model, that setting these up can have 
high transactions costs and take time. converting these models involving 
deferred land costs, partnership and sometimes loan guarantees from 
smaller to higher volume projects will heavily depend on the suitability of 
local markets and of willing partners. evaluations of their cost, effectiveness, 
value for money and contestability have still to take place, but it would appear 
that the proliferation of these types of schemes suggest that they have 
considerable scope for wider use.
developing bond finance for affordable housing
the tightening up of bank finance terms and conditions has led social 
providers to seek other avenues and in particular the capital markets and 
bond finance, which in turn have grown appreciably (Williams et al., 2011). 
Fixed interest debt matches well (in the terms usually defined by credit rating 
agencies with good quality providers who can offer essentially index-linked 
rents with the added comfort of Housing Benefit. this means of raising 
finance has been used extensively, and increasingly, by the UK housing 
association sector from the early 1990s, and its use has been sensitive to 
market conditions (Heywood, 2010). Market conditions now strongly favour 
bond finance and may even make redundant the widespread approach of 
raising long-term finance with bank debt (nHF, 2012). the main routes that 
non-profit providers have used to access bond finance are:
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•	 an issue targeted at the institutions secured on otherwise unencumbered 
housing stock owned by the issuing association. there have also been 
unsecured placements and smaller private placements;
•	 a syndicated bond aggregating up the financial needs of several smaller 
associations through, for instance, the Housing Finance corporation or 
one of the new ‘aggregators’ such as carduus in scotland;
•	 retail bonds, which can be unsecured but sold direct to individuals as 
well as institutions (that is, the former may see these as relatively low 
risk investments to augment personal pensions and/or convert them 
into isa savings vehicles – discussed further in the select committee 
(HcclG, 2012) report and evidence). organisations like places for people 
have displayed much enthusiasm for innovation in the bond market, for 
example, an unsecured debt swap arrangement for £76 million over 
30 years with a Japanese investor (Williams et al., 2011, p. 6).
More recently (6 september 2012), and as part of an infrastructure 
and building package aimed at macroeconomic growth stimulus, the UK 
government has offered the potential for state-backed guarantees for 
english housing association development worth £10 billion. this one-off 
initiative, as part of a set of wider infrastructure guarantees, will require 
primary legislation early in the new parliamentary session. the guarantees 
are envisaged to lower the cost of debt for housing associations, but at the 
time of writing there is little exact detail. it may signal further moves towards 
the more widespread use of guarantees and away from capital subsidy. it is 
understood that the government will seek to encourage participation by 
smaller associations through aggregator bonds issued by tHFc (see below). 
immediate reaction has been largely positive, though one funder quoted 
in Inside Housing (7 september 2012) said that they may not participate as 
the guarantee could lower the price of bonds towards riskless gilts and they 
would be better investing in gilts directly. such guarantees might be more 
useful to for-profit or commercial providers rather than large rsls already 
able to secure very competitive deals in the bond market.
the proposal is part of a package, which, among other things, will suspend 
section 106 affordable housing obligations for up to 75,000 private housing 
units’ worth of development – if private developers can demonstrate that 
the obligations make schemes unviable. there will be a compensating 
addition to the capital programme for housing association development, 
though again the detail remains fuzzy. it also raises questions about access to 
land for housing associations that can be part of the £10 billion programme 
identified above, let alone the compensation scheme.
Bond finance clearly works for non-profit housing providers; since the 
beginning of 2012 more than £1billion of funding has been raised and there 
appears to be considerable appetite from the city (though as indicated above, 
there is a limited supply of purchasers). the main bond issues in recent 
months have supported the largest housing associations and, in particular, 
have helped them fund new development associated with the affordable 
rent programme. this reduces borrowing capacity for those operating in 
this part of the market. clarke (2011) also argues that bonds are relatively 
inflexible, most obviously because they do not have scope for refinancing 
(early termination for conventional bonds can be costly – Williams et al., 
2011, p. 5). the transactions costs, in time and money, are also high. there 
is also the requirement for a strong credit rating. even if all of these hurdles 
are overcome, market conditions will dictate whether it is really worthwhile at 
a given point in time.
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it remains the case that smaller social providers seeking funds from the 
capital markets will need to utilise aggregator or syndicated loan models. 
tHFc is a longstanding not-for-profit organisation with a strong credit rating 
that acts as the principal in the bond market on-lending to the individual 
housing association members of the specific aggregator fund. More recently, 
tHFc has also been able to assist associations in partnership with european 
funding through the european investment Bank. there are now several 
aggregator funds available, reflecting the state of the market and the gap 
in funding facing smaller housing associations wishing to develop (see box). 
While these models are quite attractive in the abstract and have a long 
standing track record, they are syndicates and only as strong as the credit 
worthiness of their weakest member.
carduus: aggregator bond funding for affordable housing
carduus is a new scottish start-up aggregator bond issuer aiming 
to provide, via five bonds, up to one billion pounds of low cost bond 
finance for the scottish sector (and could generate up to 10,000 
affordable rent homes). they plan to have a simple bond based on UK 
government bonds structures with a duration of 30 years and the terms 
largely shaped by their credit rating. the initial proposal envisages each 
association taking up between 3 and 11 per cent of the total bond, with 
100 per cent financing (that is, zero grant from the government) and 
requires a simplified project procurement through design and build, with 
land owned or under option and planning permission granted. rents 
will be set at intermediate or mid-market levels. rents are expected to 
rise at a minimum of 3 per cent per annum. the properties have their 
principal repaid in full at the end of the 30 years but the association 
would have full title from the outset. of course, these calculations can 
be improved by scale economies, lower than average land or build costs 
or indeed through grant or state-backed guarantee.
locally­led innovation
Most of the focus, understandably, concerns finding ways to deliver volume 
or scale in the difficult present climate. this should not restrict the scope to 
do worthwhile innovation on a smaller scale, however, particularly when it 
can unlock bigger projects and make sustainable differences to affordability 
for specialist housing, in smaller settlements and rural contexts. there are 
a cluster of more local or bottom-up models that could play a wider role, 
even if they do not necessarily produce high volumes of affordable supply – 
they could unlock sites and enable wider development. Moreover, the local 
perspective puts local government at the centre of the policy and nests it 
into local housing strategies and needs and demand assessments. critical 
to the current environment is that schemes should offer good value for 
money to the public purse. the examples we have in mind in this context are 
illustrated (not exhaustively) below:
•	 revolving funds to support land purchase and support development 
finance, which may include repayable loans that are also recycled for 
further use, stretching the use of public funds. these funds have the 
potential to cost-effectively remove the major market failure associated 
with raising development finance and unlocking land for development. 
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Good examples of this thinking working in practice include initiatives by 
both scottish and english housing ministries, but probably most strongly 
through the Highland alliance land Fund (ciH, 2009);
•	 community land trusts, which retain capital growth in the trust but keep 
the consumption share of housing affordable either for purchasers 
or tenants. these restrictive covenants in the land title are local-led 
innovative uses of existing arrangements and reduce housing costs for 
households – but they still need to be developed, albeit with a slightly 
lower cost – particularly where the land has been originally passed on to 
the trust at a discounted rate from, for example, the local public sector;
•	 co-operative and mutual models (including for home ownership). Within 
the scottish innovation fund (see above) one model was funded at 
£20,000 per unit to allow a mutual home ownership society to develop 
rural housing on a shared ownership basis – moderate income borrowers 
pay back a loan from the mutual society and develop an equity stake (Field 
et al., 2012). When they move, their equity share is calculated on a similar 
basis to the community land trust model;
•	 more creative local authority activities including supporting lending by 
housing associations (scotland), providing mortgage guarantees, as well 
as supporting self-build through more supportive planning regimes, 
etc. east lothian council formed a partnership with the local housing 
association where it effectively on-lent to the association using its own 
new borrowing, in order to allow social housing to be developed by the 
association but closely aligned to local strategic needs (ciH, 2009).
this is a cluster of policies that need to be on the shelf to be potentially 
usable and such experimentation should be enabled and supported.
affordable home ownership
shared equity for new build has become an established product, as familiar 
to housing associations as it is increasingly to moderate-income would-be 
purchasers. in that context, and subject to overcoming mortgage deposit 
requirements and subsidy limits, one may ask whether it is necessary to 
offer a proliferation of different policy means to access new supply home 
ownership. it is interesting to note that the successful northern ireland 
housing co-ownership model of shared ownership has worked so well 
because it was the only model available, and it became established and well 
understood as the means of entry through shared ownership into low cost 
home ownership in the province. the scottish government has recently 
signalled its willingness to reintroduce shared ownership models having only 
just recently abandoned them in favour of shared equity. More generally, the 
complexity of different schemes and the sense that they do not often offer 
a lower cost than pro rata full ownership has restricted niche demand for 
shared ownership products (ciH in the select committee report (HcclG, 
2012)). While new build shared equity has a subsidy grant element, this 
is recyclable on resale (and maintains its real value). However, apart from 
its contribution to mixed tenure sustainability, it is less obvious what the 
incentive for social landlords is to embrace this type of model.
perhaps the most significant development in recent years has been the 
moves towards providing state or private-backed mortgage guarantees to 
help first time buyers access higher loan to value ratios and enter home 
ownership. in scotland, a partnership of home builders and lenders have 
launched a scheme to support first time buyer new build by diverting a 
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proportion of sale revenue into a guarantee fund. in england, as part of 
the new housing strategy, the council of Mortgage lenders and the House 
Builders Federation launched the newBuy Guarantee scheme. With the 
latter, purchasers can borrow up to 95 per cent of value on a new build 
property because of an indemnity fund which is funded by house builders 
depositing 3.5 per cent of sales revenue into the scheme, plus a guarantee 
that will help lenders recover any losses on the mortgage. the september 
2012 announcement of a construction and planning system stimulus 
to housing supply (see, Housing stimulus package 6/9/2012, House of 
commons library, 2012) included further funds to support first time buyers’ 
access to higher loan to value loans (not limited to new supply).
providing evidence to the select committee (HcclG, 2012, p. 58), peter 
Williams cautioned that this type of scheme threatened to crowd out other 
mortgage lending in the limited current market environment. Moreover, 
as the select committee report stresses, because of the typical new build 
price premium, there may well be increased risk of new purchasers falling 
into negative equity in a housing market that, outside of london, remains 
vulnerable to price falls. the select committee also noted that it was difficult 
for smaller scale developers to become involved in these sorts of scheme. it 
is worth nothing that traditional mortgage indemnity guarantees provided 
typical cover for the losses made above 85 per cent of the secured loan 
value. there seems to be a case, therefore, to promote the case for a more 
conservative but sustainable trade-off between the first time buyer loan to 
value ceiling, the size of typical deposits required and a deeper indemnity 
guarantee, for example, 10 per cent rather than 5 per cent of the loan value.
conclusions
We have emphasised three elements in the UK context (social reits, 
partnership models and bond finance), as well as identifying a cluster of other 
possible innovations that either do not have the scale or, in the case of the 
mortgage indemnities, face challenges or wider costs. We do not repeat 
the key points made above; instead, we now move on to a final concluding 
synthesis of the material examined in the previous three chapters.
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7 synthesIs and 
conclusIons
securing access to affordable housing has always 
been an objective of housing policy. For many 
decades the focus of housing policy in the UK has 
been on securing housing for the poorest and most 
vulnerable households. the high levels of income 
inequality and poverty in the UK meant that both 
deep supply-side subsidies and Housing Benefit 
were employed, bringing with them concerns about 
the creation of poverty neighborhoods.
the reason why policy could focus on low income groups was that owner-
occupation was accessible to a wide section of the community. this was 
boosted by rtB and facilitated by the ready availability of mortgage finance. 
However, even before the credit crunch and GFc, more and more people 
were priced out of home-ownership, and ownership levels in england 
have been declining markedly among young and now middle-aged groups 
(stephens, 2011b).
these problems have been overlaid by the problem of persistent 
price volatility in the housing market, causing much social and economic 
damage. these issues were addressed by the JrF Housing Market 
taskforce (stephens, 2011b), which spelled out the need to secure marked 
improvements in the level of new supply, along with a series of other 
measures to stabilise the housing market within the context of a balanced 
tenure choice.
it is in this context that this report has addressed the question of housing 
supply. there remains a growing need for more traditional social rented 
housing, which is the only means of securing secure and affordable housing 
for those households who cannot safely obtain home-ownership (stephens, 
2011b). there is a strong economic, as well as social case, for arguing that 
the government should be prepared to increase borrowing to finance a social 
housing programme. the UK government can borrow very cheaply and such 
a programme would aid economic recovery, while supporting construction.
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it is also clear that the increases in general supply needed to make 
housing affordable once again to the majority of households is not going 
to be obtained in the near future. the focus of this report was primarily on 
examining programmes in other countries where traditions of providing 
relatively shallow subsidies to boost housing supply are more strongly 
entrenched than in the UK.
the programmes examined were drawn from a variety of countries 
representing a range of social and economic as well as housing, systems. in 
considering the suitability of individual programmes for transfer to the UK, 
we took into account the wider context. For this reason, no scheme could be 
adopted without adaptation to a UK context. there is no ‘silver bullet’, but 
there are ideas that could usefully be adapted and adopted.
key evidence review messages
•	 there needs to be recognition that the growth in more intermediate or 
affordable models will encourage the shift away from new provision for 
deeper subsidy social housing, which will have profound consequences for 
those on low incomes.
•	 the broader structure and policy framework that constitutes the national 
housing system, including welfare benefits, is a critical frame within 
which approaches to finance innovation takes place and policy transfer is 
contemplated.
•	 Many potential approaches exist (or can be readily conceived) but they 
all have strengths and weaknesses when set against reasonable key tests, 
such as scalability, value for money, time to market and effective targeting.
•	 there needs to be clear overarching policy vision, not just about individual 
policies, but the overall mix of policies and their system-level coherence, 
including how they are delivered and by whom.
•	 the understandable effort to develop a larger private sector contribution 
has knock-on effects elsewhere in the system such as challenging not-
for-profit governance ramifications.
While we think that all of the policies examined (chapters 4–6) have merit 
and are ideas at least worth further debate in a UK context, we would stress 
the potential of a sub-set:
•	 the spanish vpo developer/occupier system of new supply subsidy. it 
is flexible (though not completely transparent) but has suffered in the 
recent downturn. the scheme is, however, readily transferable (it would 
not require new institutional infrastructure) and could support stimulus 
activity;
•	 the irish private renting discounted rent long lease model that also serves 
to address work incentives and augment affordable supply by binding the 
private rented sector into long leases and sub-market rents;
•	 the australian nras tax credit application of the Us low-income housing 
tax credit model. the combination of competition between providers, 
opportunities to blend subsidy and the beneficial place making aspects of 
the policy are all attractive innovations in a UK context;
•	 the danish housing association national surplus fund, which although 
based on principles of solidarity that may seem alien in a UK context, 
allows surplus funds to be used creatively, though one needs to recognise 
that government may simply offset the fund with lower subsidy. However, 
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more fundamentally, this may be a more acceptable way voluntarily to 
unlock housing association long-term reserves;
•	 loan guarantees backed by the central or local state but more on the lines 
of the scottish national Housing trust rather than as a way of generally 
lowering the cost of bonds (as it appears the new english £10 billion fund 
will do) and developing a dutch-style guarantee and governance model;
•	 first time buyer policies that assist with the deposit problem – either 
via the canadian silent mortgage or through adjustment to the FirstBuy 
or newBuy models such that the indemnity for the latter operates at a 
higher deposit percentage than the 5 per cent currently in practice.
emerging themes
in the course of the work, a number of broader themes also emerged. First, 
there is evidently an appetite for state­backed guarantees but, as suggested 
above, there should be a note of caution.
second, competition or contestability between (for-profit and 
non-profit) providers is important. this can encourage efficiency and 
experimentation through competition. resources for affordable housing are 
scarce and if these models encourage their conservation and competition for 
demand, then this is a positive development.
third, many countries indicated that subsidy can be distributed from 
the centre (for example, national tax authorities or federal programmes) to 
lower tiers of government where there is freedom at the more local level 
to augment subsidy (for example, with land) for locally-tailored affordable 
housing solutions. in our devolved nation state such arrangements are also 
possible, particularly if we were to move to the use of tax credits at the UK 
level, possibly augmented with devolved government subsidy.
Fourth, a case that can be made for flexible, blended use of subsidy – 
again, in the interests of experimentation and tailored solutions. an emerging 
‘localism’ and devolution in housing policies, and not just in the UK, means 
that innovation in housing policy is increasingly ‘bottom-up’ and that national 
or federal policy responses are increasingly framed around relatively simple 
supports that can be locally blended and augmented to serve different 
purposes.
However, the need for value for money requires that tests have to be 
in place to ensure that subsidy is not over-provided on individual units or 
poorly targeted. We do not think it is beyond the wit of regulators to operate 
oversight of subsidy systems that could address this point, either through 
tests by relevant agencies checking for value for money and efficiency or 
through bidding mechanisms, such as auctions and challenge funds.
Fifth, we have seen in different european systems (including the ones 
with more generous social security systems) that social housing can benefit 
financially (and in terms of its governance) from a more solidarity­based or 
collaborative set of structures. While this may not be culturally translatable, 
it may be feasible on a smaller more local or specialist scale.
sixth, there is increased interest in management income streams 
associated with the reits, sale and leaseback vehicles and the tax credit 
models discussed earlier. additional revenue is of course increasingly 
important to social providers, but there are risks: investment partners may 
seek alternative managers – that is, it is not a guaranteed source of income 
(nor, arguably, should it be).
seventh, in contrast to complex schemes such as the liHtc, we have also 
seen the value of simple schemes that are readily communicated to users 
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and where the effects are simple to follow and unintended consequences less 
likely. the canadian silent mortgage and policies such as revolving funds are 
straightforward and appear less prone to unintended consequences.
eighth, the intended shift upmarket has meant relatively shallow subsidy 
per unit (particularly where the offer is time-limited: deeper subsidy is still 
required for affordable housing in perpetuity). With overall programmes of 
pre-2010 size this can mean a stretching of that resource – but of course 
the reality is that programmes have been massively scaled back.
ninth, the key complementary measure alongside shallower subsidy is to 
‘sweat’ the existing assets of providers. indeed, one can reasonably interpret 
the aHp as just that, capturing the rise in balance sheets and financial 
capacity associated with assets owned by housing associations increased in 
value through the property boom.
Finally, the scope for innovation is intimately related to the regulatory 
stance – not just in terms of social housing’s governance and regulation 
but in particular, the interface between non-profit housing and the private 
financial sector and its regulation. also relevant in this context are the public 
accounting rules that determine the envelope of what is possible when 
subsidy or public loans or indeed guarantees are involved.
the need for a wider long­term housing policy framework
the focus has been on making a difference in the current environment. We 
also think that policies need to be considered in the longer term wherein 
a wider set of policies seek to minimise fundamental problems and market 
failures. this might then allow a better prioritisation of resources towards 
those most in need.
What would such a framework look like? lawson et al. (2010) argued, 
first, for principles that embrace a public vision and objectives of affordable 
housing. in other words, a broad stakeholder consensus is required and 
not just one governed by the needs of private finance (though that should 
not be overlooked or fatally compromised). a second useful element is that 
they call for efficient organisation of the sector in terms of regulation and 
governance, subsidy design, cross-subsidy and in encouraging competition 
by providers. third, they propose that low-income rental subsidies from 
government rather than individual provider rental policy should determine 
affordability outcomes for lower income households. they also suggest that 
national priorities should find local delivery form in practice.
We would add three further dimensions:
•	 affordable housing policy should be located in a wider vision of place and 
the boundaries between the market and the state based on long-term 
policies to address market failure and combatting housing or place-based 
poverty.
•	 national policies must be based on locally derived consistent estimates 
of need and market outcomes, in order to provide the most effective 
investment case for scarce housing resources. this evidence base is 
an essential public good to improve the efficient use of resources for 
affordable supply.
•	 We also propose developing rule consistency in housing policy. in 
macroeconomics policy makers are encouraged to establish a set of rules 
to help meet macro objectives such as in relation to public borrowing 
or monetary expansion. critically, any future policy innovations must be 
consistent with those rules. the idea would be that once the vision for 
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affordable housing is agreed and its operational version articulated – new 
policies would need to pass an impact assessment that judged them to be 
sufficiently consistent with that set of objectives. this may seem obvious 
but recent experience suggests otherwise.
the substance of housing policy in the long run should address principal 
market failures. We concur with the Joseph rowntree Foundation housing 
market taskforce that market volatility should be minimised. that requires 
looking again at housing taxation and the safety net for vulnerable home-
owners. it also would mean thinking constructively about the wider market 
role of the private rented sector. We agree also with Kate Barker and others 
(stephens, 2011b) that the long-term supply elasticity of housing has to be 
raised systematically and that will involve changes to land planning (see the 
companion international evidence review on land by ccHpr for the Joseph 
rowntree Foundation).
third, the immediate key market failure in the mortgage market has to 
be addressed. the likelihood, however, is that the fundamentals constraining 
banks are so large compared to likely intervention, that significant 
improvements to mortgage lending will take several years. Unfortunately, 
constrained mortgage markets will be with us for as long as greatly reduced 
public funding. Finally, and despite the welfare benefit reforms underway, we 
should not lose sight of the need to reappraise the proper role and structure 
of a housing allowance in the long term.
earlier, the radical packages of ippr and policy exchange were presented 
as ‘all or nothing’ proposals. We think the focus on correcting market failures 
and reforming in areas of taxation, benefits and housing supply are pretty 
radical themselves, but they do not per se require dramatic changes to non-
market housing. We caution against major overhaul of a sector characterised 
by long-term contracts and commitments to its tenants.
conclusions
Without step-change, the affordable rent sector not social rent is from 
where new supply will predominantly come. this is likely to segment non-
market housing into a new and growing affordable sector targeted at 
moderate-income in-work households, one in competition with the private 
rented sector. alongside it will be a weakly growing or static social sector 
housing stock, one priced out of new subsidised development, increasingly 
housing the lowest income households and facing a growing queue of 
unmet need. it is not clear how the growth of the former will filter down into 
more opportunities for the latter. this is the biggest single challenge facing 
affordable housing policy on the current trajectory.
Governments across the UK in this scenario are faced with difficult 
choices. one choice would be to follow scotland’s direction and publically 
target a proportion of its programme (2/3) as social rent as opposed to 
affordable. this commitment may turn out to be unsustainable but they do 
have a (presently) unique ability to draw more on (comparatively cheaper) 
council house building if required. council housing finance reform in england 
is hugely important but as elsewhere it is the rules governing financial 
capacity and the imposition of caps on borrowing that constrain what is 
possible. the alternative is to accept that new social housing will not expand 
and meeting need will inevitably require a greater input from the private 
rented sector, while higher rents in the affordable sector risk greater work 
disincentives and higher exchequer benefit costs.
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the evidence review focused on a small number of key criteria, chief 
among them are scale, speed of implementation and value for money. large-
scale programmes associated with new models take time as the affordable 
rent programme indicates and the evolution of the nHt in scotland 
demonstrate. However, there are many smaller-scale innovations that are 
able to make a positive contribution and their lack of scale should not be 
a deterrent to their continued effective contribution in rural markets, land 
markets, development finance, etc. equally, the creative use of syndicated or 
aggregating bonds could in the current market environment offer scale to 
many smaller special providers unable otherwise to access finance, but which 
are perfectly robust financially.
the financial crisis and its ramifications have initiated a fundamental 
reassessment of how non-market housing will be provided and who will likely 
receive it and how much that will cost. this will in turn put conventional social 
housing under increased pressure of housing need. against this background 
we have explored policies that can add to social and primarily affordable 
supply but conclude that volume innovation takes time and does not come 
for free. However, there are many genuinely positive contributions that we 
can draw from, including in different parts of the UK. it is essential that we do 
so.
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notes
1 present in the half-day discussion: Kenneth Gibb, duncan Maclennan, Mark stephens, tony 
o’sullivan (newhaven research), derek Ballantyne) Housing services corporation, toronto), 
per ahren (norwegian state Housing Bank), Michael lennon (Housing choices australia), 
Bob Millar (new city vision), Brigitta Gomez-neilson (danish institute of Governmental 
research), alberdi Baralides (eurocatalyst, spain).
2 We reviewed both the French and austrian policies in our european assessment for this 
project but decided not to develop them as proposals since they did not meet our criteria.
3 Based on Bank of england spot rate exchange rate, 17 January 2013, at 1.5165 australian 
dollars to the pound sterling.
4 the minimum and maximum income limits for different household types is currently: one 
adult 42,718–53,398; two adults 59,057–73,822; three adults 75,396–94,245; four adults 
91,735–114,669; sole parent with one child 59,099–73,874; sole parent with two children 
73,267–91,584; sole parent with three children 87,435–109,294; couple with one child 
73,225–91,532; couple with two children 87,393–109,242; couple with three children 
101,561–126,952.
5 Based on Bank of england spot rate exchange rate, 17 January 2013, at 1.5736 canadian 
dollars to the pound sterling.
6 desai et al. 2011 provide a more detailed, nuanced description of how the system operates. 
‘the liHtc program allocates two types of housing credits, depending on how a project is 
financed. the first type of credit (“9 per cent credit”) is allocated to new construction projects 
that receive no other federal subsidies, with credits apportioned to states based on their 
population. initial allocations for the program were $1.25 per capita, increased to $1.50 in 
2002, $1.75 in 2003, and indexed for inflation thereafter. if a project is financed with private-
activity tax exempt bonds, it is eligible for the second type of credit (“4 per cent credit”). 
Unlike the 9 per cent credit, the 4 per cent credits are capped indirectly through state private 
activity bond caps, rather than per capita. each dollar of allocated credit entitles the investor 
to a dollar tax credit each year for ten years.’ (p. 2).
7 this section is based on a pro-forma completed by Baralides alberdi.
8 this section is based on a pro-forma completed by Brigitta Gomez-neilson.
9 this section is based on a pro-forma completed by Michelle norris.
10 this section is based on a pro-forma completed by Marja elsinga and Kees dol.
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11 exchange rate at 18 January 2013 (european central Bank) – 0.8372. this exchange rate is 
used throughout the report.
12 vestia is a rotterdam-based housing association with a stock of 89,000 properties, which was 
threatened with bankruptcy after an ill-judged interest rate swap left it short of €2.1 billion. 
the situation did not arise from the financial crisis, but from an internal error of judgement 
that may have been caused by deficiencies in its internal governance. it was therefore 
primarily a question of treasury management, and may have fallen outside the Housing act. 
to prevent vestia from entering bankruptcy proceedings, WsW provided a liquidity facility of 
ca. €1.5 billion. cFv has committed another €700 million in support over ten years, which 
will require other associations to increase their contributions to the fund. vestia will meet its 
obligations through a mixture of rent increases and sale of assets. Ultimately some €2 billion 
of investment capacity will have been lost to the sector, but on the other hand solidarity 
appears to have worked to prevent the loss of triple a ratings for the sector.
13 this section is based on a pro-forma completed by stefan Kofner.
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